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SARAH R. WASSERMAN RAJEC*
ABSTRACT
Intellectual property law has become bound up in a debate about
appropriate remedies for violations of the World Trade Organization Agreement. As an alternative to traditional countermeasures
that consist of retaliation under the violated agreement, the World
Trade Organization “(WTO”) contemplates that violations of one
of its covered agreements may be remedied through “cross-retaliation,” or retaliation under another agreement. One form of
cross-retaliation has garnered interest in recent years: the threat
to suspend intellectual property rights in response to unrelated
trade violations.
Cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension
is theoretically appealing for its potential to avoid problems inherent in traditional retaliatory countermeasures—often tariff increases. Cross-retaliation appears attractive because its strength
as a remedy is theoretically dependent on the value of the intellectual property rights at stake, rather than the political or economic
strength of the complaining country. Proponents suggest it will
solve power differential problems at the WTO while encouraging
compliance.
Missing from the conversation about cross-retaliation are (1) an
assessment of its effectiveness in cases where it has been approved,
and (2) an advocate for what I call the “IP hostage” of trade re-
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taliation—that is, an account of the potential costs that may accompany threats to intellectual property rights. This account is
useful in explaining why cross-retaliation has not been as effective
as its proponents have suggested it would be. This Article fills the
gap in the literature by providing case studies of the instances in
which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has approved intellectual
property rights suspension as a means of trade retaliation. Based
on these case studies, this Article argues that cross-retaliation may
be a useful tool in some, limited circumstances, but generally suffers from many of the same problems as traditional retaliatory
measures, particularly as they relate to developing countries with
smaller economies. Moreover, this Article argues that the unique
characteristics of intellectual property rights make it particularly
difficult to carry out a threat of cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension. Taking intellectual property
rights hostage will not solve problems inherent in the remedial
scheme for trade violations.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement (“WTO Agreement”)1 establishing the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is notable for its near-worldwide membership, sweeping scope, and the strong remedies it provides in the event of
an uncured breach.2 In addition to lowering tariffs even further below those
agreed to through the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”),3 the WTO Agreement extends beyond tariff rates to address nontariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers to trade encompassed by the WTO
include areas of regulation traditionally seen as the domain of local governments. For example, the WTO Agreement includes agreements on trade in
services, sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, and—perhaps most
controversially—intellectual property.4 The dispute settlement process and
remedies provided for under the WTO, moreover, responded to one of the
main critiques of other international agreements: that they lack means of enforcement.5 The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”)6 sets up a process for resolving disputes between WTO member countries and, when that
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154–55 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
2. Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization in 2020, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 167,
167–68, 172 (2005); Mark Wu, Rethinking the Temporary Breach Puzzle: A Window on the Future
of International Trade Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 95, 152 (2015) (describing the strength of the
dispute settlement system, stemming from its “compulsory jurisdiction, detailed procedural rules, a
formalized appellate review process, and the possibility of sanctions”).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188
[hereinafter GATT].
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
5. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 333,
336 (1999) (“[D]ispute resolution is not simply a mechanism for neutral application of legislated
rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance.”).
6. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22.3,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
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fails, approval of retaliatory countermeasures for ongoing violations by the
WTO itself—typically through retaliation under the same agreement that was
violated.7 Its enforcement measures have made the WTO one of the strongest
international agreements currently in force.8 At the same time, the enforcement measures have been critiqued for perpetuating economic and power imbalances among countries due to structural aspects of remedies that make
them less functional for small or economically weak countries. In particular,
the measures frustrate economically weaker countries’ ability to benefit from
effective remedies because the imposition of retaliatory remedies may not
impact the violator country and may instead harm the complaining country.9
This disadvantage adds to the difficulties economically weaker countries already face in using the WTO to seek enforcement due to the high cost of the
action.10 Scholars, practitioners, and member countries have recently turned
towards another allowable remedial scheme to circumvent these problems—
cross-retaliation.11
The WTO Agreement has garnered attention both for its inclusion of the
DSU and for the broad scope of activities covered by the agreement in addition to tariffs. These two characteristics combine in Article 22 of the DSU

7. Id.
8. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 266 (2011); Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 H. J. INT’L L.
337, 337 (2007) (discussing how the WTO remedial scheme differs from those of other international
treaties).
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 177 (2006) (discussing costs of bringing challenges for smaller developing countries); Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why It Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 182 (Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Ser. No. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Shaffer, Developing Country].
11. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2011) (suggesting the “beneficial effects that trade retaliation in intellectual property can have for developing countries”);
Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403 (arguing for the use of cross-retaliation);
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Suspending IP Obligations Under TRIPS: A Viable Alternative to Enforce Prevailing WTO Rulings?, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., 1 (April 2008); Frederick M. Abbott,
Cross-retaliation in TRIPS: Issues of Law and Practice, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 536 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010)
(“Attention is increasingly focusing on the possibility of developing members suspending concessions relating to intellectual property rights . . . as a means to induce compliance by developed members.”). In addition, a group of countries has proposed making it easier for developing countries to
pursue cross-retaliation following a finding of a WTO violation. Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries Proposals on
DSU, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/19 (Oct. 9, 2002).
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to allow for cross-retaliation. This provision allows retaliation against countries found to be in continued noncompliance with the WTO through suspension of concessions under any WTO treaty, even those concessions not implicated in the dispute.12 This remedy stands in contrast to conventional
countermeasures under the DSU that allow for retaliation under the violated
agreement only. For example, conventional countermeasures would allow a
complaining country to raise tariffs on beef imports to counter a noncompliant country’s unfair tariffs on its poultry. Under WTO Article 22, however,
a complaining country is permitted to suspend concessions under a different
agreement than the one that was the subject of the initial violation. The option to cross-retaliate has recently gained traction among scholars, practitioners, and advocates, particularly those arguing on behalf of developing countries.13 Moreover, countries complaining of a WTO violation find suspension
of intellectual property (“IP”) rights under the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) to be a particularly attractive option because it hits the violator country where it hurts and is a seemingly low-cost option to the complaining country.14
In addition to debates about the unequal availability of the dispute settlement system to developing countries, there is a debate about what the ultimate aim of the system is: compliance, compensation, or a minimization of
breach. Scholars and advocates have debated whether countermeasures authorized by the WTO’s DSU are meant to—and, moreover, whether they
ought to—induce compliance by the offender or compensate industries for
their harms (thereby allowing for something analogous to “efficient breach”
in contract law). One view is that countermeasures ought to induce compliance, therefore justifying strong remedies and counseling an increased reliance on cross-retaliation.15 The other view is that remedies are meant to be

12. DSU, supra note 6; Sebastian, supra note 8, at 340–41 (describing the process for seeking
remedies).
13. See supra note 11.
14. See infra Part I.D.
15. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstanding on
the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 60–63 (1997) (noting that WTO members
are legally obligated to comply with the findings of dispute proceedings and thus specific performance is required of members); Marco Bronckers & Freya Baetens, Reconsidering Financial Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 281, 291 (2013) (arguing that compliance is
the main purpose of remedies because it allows for “security and predictability” of the multilateral
trading system, consistent with DSU Art. 3 (2)); Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 1 (“Given the imbalances in trade and economic power amongst WTO Members, the central issue is whether suspending
TRIPS obligations can do a significantly better job than traditional retaliation in facilitating compliance by powerful WTO Members.”); see also William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 68 (1988) (suggesting that enforcement is the principal goal of the dispute
settlement system in GATT).
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commensurate with the harm imposed on a complaining country, thereby allowing for breach of WTO commitments in some situations.16 The WTO has
not historically allowed for financial damages as a remedy for breach of the
agreement. However, recent strategic use of cross-retaliation suggests its
ability to serve as a pathway to de facto financial penalty payments—or, as
Rachel Brewster describes it, cross-retaliation allows parties to “bargain to
mutually agreed resolutions of disputes that are less than full compliance.”17
A recent set of cross-retaliation cases gives insight into this practice and
puts a new spin on a well-tread debate about appropriate sanctions for WTO
violations.18 In both cases, intellectual property rights suspension was approved by the WTO’s dispute settlement body, but in neither case have the
complaining countries made good on their threats, despite the continuation
of violations.19 In the first, Antigua and Barbuda received authorization to
suspend copyright protection against U.S. rights-holders as a means of retaliation against the United States’ anti-racketeering laws and prohibitions on
online gambling.20 The United States’ laws were found to be in violation of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).21 Despite many
threats, however, Antigua has not suspended its protection of copyrights. Nor
have the countries reached a settlement. The U.S. laws remain in place, and
Antigua continues to enforce the copyrights of U.S. rights-holders. The second case, involving Brazil, is a contrast. Brazil received authorization to suspend patent rights in certain pharmaceutical patents owned by U.S. companies as a remedy for continued violations of the WTO and subsidies
agreements by the United States in its cotton industry.22 The United States
made some changes to its agricultural subsidy program, but remains in violation of the WTO. However, Brazil has not followed through on its threat.
16. Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, ‘Optimal’ Retaliation in the WTO—A Commentary
on the Upland Cotton Arbitration, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 133, 150–51 (2011) (noting that the
“equivalence” standard for determining countermeasures is not consistent with a compliance-inducing purpose); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal
Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 245 (2011);
Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions,
54 HARV. INT’L L. J. 259, 265 (2013)..
17. Brewster, supra note 16, at 288.
18. See infra Part II.
19. Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); Arbitrator Decision,
United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 6.3, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009).
20. Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); see also discussion
infra Section III.B.
21. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
22. Arbitrator Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 6.3, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009); see also discussion infra Section III.C.
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Instead, the United States recently entered a financial settlement with Brazil,
paying $300 million to the Brazilian Cotton Institute.23 The threat of intellectual property rights suspension resulted in a financial settlement for Brazil,
but in the case of Antigua—nothing.
These cases raise serious questions about the premise that cross-retaliation induces compliance or that it may be a pathway to greater access to protected goods for citizens in developing countries. They also demonstrate the
difficulty of crafting remedies that provide an appropriate measure of or compensation for damages, suggesting that cross-retaliation may be useful as a
means of reaching this goal, but in far fewer circumstances than others have
suggested. Instead, the cases demonstrate that threats to intellectual property
rights suffer from many of the same drawbacks as other forms of remedies
when there are large economic disparities between the parties. The minimal
benefits derived through cross-retaliation can be better understood by exploring the considerable costs associated with moving from a threat of suspension
to actual suspension of intellectual property rights.
The cost of cross-retaliation through suspension of intellectual property
rights is generally treated as a footnote by those discussing the potential benefits of such a system, as are the potential costs to innovation of threatening
such suspension. After all, if cross-retaliation remains a mere threat and is
never implemented, perhaps that cost is minimal. However, a full account of
the value of cross-retaliation demands more. Cross-retaliation deputizes innovative industries to represent a global interest in WTO compliance, which
is costly to the industry and ineffective, since the industries are in fact selfinterested. The increased global harmonization of intellectual property laws
is driven by the goals of decreasing barriers to trade and increasing investment in innovation. However, cross-retaliation allows complaining countries
to suspend intellectual property rights, frustrating that interest. If threats of
suspension become more frequent, they may result in lower investment in innovative industries. Admittedly, this Article argues that implementation of
cross-retaliation is unlikely, and explores the reasons why. Nevertheless, it
is worth detailing the potential costs of such retaliatory measures on the theory that the more frequent threats of cross-retaliation become, the more likely
that IP rights suspension will be imposed at some point. Even for those who
think global intellectual property rights are too strong, actual suspension
through cross-retaliation would be a blunt and poorly-aimed instrument with
which to target strong intellectual property laws.24

23. Mem. Of Understanding Related to the Cotton Dispute (WT/DS267) entered into by the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of
Brazil (Oct. 1, 2014), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/20141001201606893.pdf.
24. See infra Part III.B.
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Moreover, this exploration of the potential costs of intellectual property
rights-suspension highlights the characteristics that distinguish it from other
retaliatory measures, providing insight into why it is so rarely implemented.
Importantly, there are practical difficulties associated with implementing
cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension. First, as
more companies operate as global enterprises, it is difficult to identify the
holders of intellectual property rights that are from an offending country,
which makes the threat less effective. In addition, to benefit from intellectual
property rights suspension, countries must have an industry that is sufficiently strong to be able to infringe in ways that benefit the domestic market
and be willing to do so, despite the risk that the authorization will be withdrawn if and when the offending country brings its laws back into compliance. None of these criticisms are insurmountable, but each deserves attention, particularly given the unlikely benefits of cross-retaliation. Importantly,
however, the countries that are best able to overcome the barriers to using
intellectual property rights-suspension to seek relief are not the least developed countries with the smallest economies.
Part I of this Article discusses the structure and theory of remedies at
the WTO. Part II describes cases in which cross-sector retaliation has been
approved by the Dispute Settlement Body and the subsequent history as it
relates to compliance or financial settlement. Part III analyzes these cases in
light of the theory behind WTO remedies and the inclusion of intellectual
property rights within the WTO Agreement. The Article concludes by arguing that cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension neither solves the problems associated with WTO remedies, nor have its potential benefits been realized. Instead, cross-retaliation suffers from many of the
same problems as traditional WTO remedies. Its potential costs to innovation
are unlikely to be very high if it is rarely threatened or imposed. And, its rare
use is due in large part to the characteristics of intellectual property rights
that make this remedy difficult to implement. Ultimately, cross-retaliation
through IP rights suspension is a remedy the threat of which may be useful
to promote settlement of claims for some subset of developing countries, but
it fails as a means to counteract the disadvantages faced by least developed
countries seeking compliance or redress for continuing violations by more
powerful countries.
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I. REMEDIES AT THE WTO: STRUCTURE AND THEORY
In the twentieth century, countries have turned to international trade law
to increase global welfare by lowering barriers to trade.25 According to modern trade theory, lower tariffs increase competition and lead countries to specialize in industries in which they have a comparative advantage over others.26 The GATT significantly reduced barriers to trade by, inter alia, setting
a harmonized tariff schedule and providing that countries extend any trade
concession made to one country to all member countries.27 The GATT and
subsequent rounds of negotiation have resulted in the reduction of thousands
of tariffs and affected tens of billions of dollars of trade.28 One strength of
the Agreement has been the near worldwide participation. Countries are better able to abandon protectionist measures when the changes are directly coupled to increased availability of new markets and cheaper imports. Nevertheless, countries still seek to encourage their domestic industries and
implement non-tariff means of support that have, in turn, spurred new agreements.29 Thus, momentum built to address measures constituting non-tariff
barriers to trade.
Further rounds of negotiations led to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement,
which established the WTO Agreement. The WTO Agreement expanded

25. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for
Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 317, 328, 332–39 (2014) (comparing modern international trade
law with mercantilist trade theories).
26. KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY 25–26 (2012). This
book provides an example in which the United States produces ten million roses for Valentine’s
Day, although with the same resources it could have produced one hundred thousand computers.
Id. Columbia, in contrast, can produce ten million roses easily, whereas devoting those resources
to making computers would only yield thirty thousand computers. Id. The difference in price ratios
means that roses are relatively more expensive to produce in the United States in winter than in
Columbia, and vice versa with respect to computers. Id. Low tariffs allow the United States to stop
growing winter roses and Columbia to shift its resources out of computer manufacturing. Both
countries are better off than before. Id. This is the (very) basic example of the potential gains from
trade based on comparative advantage, generally attributed to the economist David Ricardo. See
Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 55 (1998).
27. GATT, supra note 3 (quoting the purpose of the GATT as the “substantial reduction of
tariffs and other trade barriers and to the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis”).
28. See Douglas A. Irwin, International Trade Agreements, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/InternationalTradeAgreements.html (last visited
July 12, 2016) (“The annual gain from removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade as a result of
the Uruguay Round Agreement . . . has been put at about $96 billion, or 0.4 percent of world
GDP.”).
29. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101
MINN. L. REV. 59 (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745632.
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significantly on the GATT.30 In addition to further lowering tariffs, the WTO
Agreement included agreements on areas considered non-tariff barriers to
trade, such as telecommunications, industrial and product safety standards,
and intellectual property—all areas of governance that are typically thought
to implement domestic policy preferences rather than solely protectionist
purposes.31 TRIPS seeks to minimize variations in the protection of intellectual property rights through minimum requirements for protection of intellectual property rights.32 The argument in favor of harmonization of intellectual property laws is that wildly different regimes of protection made it
difficult for companies to operate across borders, whereas the certainty of
intellectual property rights protection would encourage greater amounts of
foreign direct investment and manufacturing of goods worldwide. The
TRIPS Agreement has provided a strong push towards a harmonized patent
law, addressing substantive measures in addition to the procedural issues that
were the primary focus of previous agreements.33 Though copyright law already enjoyed some substantive harmonization pre-TRIPS, it also gained
stronger global protection through the Agreement.34 In addition, the TRIPS
Agreement includes enforcement measures—common to all the WTO agreements—that previous intellectual property law agreements did not.35 The negotiations surrounding the TRIPS Agreement were contentious and split
along lines of development and wealth. A common narrative shows that developing and least developed countries were strong-armed into accepting the
requirements of TRIPS in order to gain access to markets crucial for their
economic growth.36

30. Marrakesh Agreement supra note 1.
31. See id. (stating desire of members to substantially reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade
in order to raise standards of living and employment levels, expand the production of and trade in
goods and services, and allow for optimal use of world resources).
32. TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 1.
33. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2824 (1999) (describing the TRIPS Agreement as a “tectonic shift in the landscape of
intellectual property law”); see also Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent Law, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 153, 167 (2013) (describing how TRIPS requirements address
patent-eligible subject matter, standards of patentability, and the duration and scope of rights, inter
alia).
34. Rajec, supra note 33, at 154.
35. DSU, supra note 6, art. 1.
36. HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 39–40 (2007) (describing the United States’ strategy of withdrawing certain
trade benefits and threatening trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act as retaliation for
refusal to grant certain patent rights); Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L.
193, 194 (2002) (describing how “American-based multinational corporations” pushed for adoption
of TRIPS).
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The WTO’s enforcement measures serve to strengthen the provisions in
TRIPS, which may be seen as a win for proponents of strong intellectual
property rights.37 However, they also allow aggrieved countries to threaten
TRIPS suspension in response to violations of other agreements in certain
circumstances.
The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (“DSB”) may authorize compensatory or retaliatory trade measures against a country found in violation
of one of its constituent agreements, following an opportunity for the violator
country to amend its laws or practices.38 Retaliatory measures (or countermeasures) generally consist of a suspension of concessions by the complaining country towards the noncompliant country.39 As a result, retaliatory
measures increase trade barriers for the noncompliant member.40
A. WTO Structure for Retaliation: Compensation, Countermeasures,
and Cross-Retaliation
The WTO Agreement includes a Dispute Settlement Understanding
Agreement (“DSU”) that details how complaints are to be filed and disputes
resolved.41 The WTO’s treatment of dispute resolution represents a change
from the GATT’s negotiation model of dispute settlement to a more robust
adjudicative system under the WTO.42 At the time, it was thought that a
stronger adjudicatory system would prove to be fairer to weaker countries,
whereas negotiations allowed “some countries to use their relative political
37. Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement
Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 N. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 104–05 (2004) (discussing the strong impact of TRIPS due to the linkage of intellectual property rights with trade and the
enforcement measures available); Adrian Macey, Dispute Settlement in TRIPS: A Two-Edged
Sword, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY
ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 351, 351–54 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) (describing
how the United States wanted to institutionalize cross-retaliation as a means of ensuring intellectual
property law enforcement through suspension of trade concessions against developing countries).
38. DSU, supra note 6, art. 21(3).
39. The WTO also provides for a rarely-used remedy of “compensation,” according to which
the violator country eases trade barriers unrelated to the dispute. Id. art. 22(4). Because it is rare,
this Article does not explore it.
40. Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—Toward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 337 (2000) (describing the imposition
of countermeasures as “detrimental to free trade principles”); Sebastian, supra note 8, at 338 (“[T]he
remedy for one violation of the treaty is an offsetting violation of the treaty.”).
41. DSU, supra note 6, art. 1.
42. Davey, supra note 15, at 60. The GATT stressed negotiations between parties; there was
no right to establishment of a panel, and a panel report could only be adopted by consensus of
members (including the “losing” party). Id. at 58, 60; GATT art. XXIII:2; see also Shaffer, Developing Country, supra note 10, at 168 (“With the WTO’s creation on January 1, 1995, international
trade rules became more detailed, and their application more judicialized.” (footnote omitted) (citing Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD.
147 (1999)).
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and economic strength to take advantage of weaker countries.”43 As a result,
conflict resolution at the WTO has been lauded as more “legal” and less “political” than dispute settlement under other treaties and international agreements.44 In practice, however, the costs of bringing disputes and structural
characteristics have led to critiques that dispute settlement at the WTO also
suffers from power differentials. It is this critique, discussed further below,
that has many turning to cross-retaliation as a potential method to empower
developing countries in WTO enforcement.45
The DSU establishes the DSB to oversee trade disputes, and grants authority to assign dispute settlement panels if the parties are unable to resolve
the dispute through consultations.46 Panel decisions are subject to appeal,
heard by the Appellate Body.47 Decisions by the DSB are automatically
adopted, which contrasts with the GATT’s requirement of a consensus for
adoption, allowing a losing party to block adoption of a panel report.48 When
a violation is found, the DSU requires “prompt compliance,” monitored by
the DSB.49 If a noncompliant country fails to bring its laws into compliance,
the DSU dictates the process for the complainant to request permission to
retaliate.
Member countries often resolve their disputes without the involvement
of a dispute settlement panel, and only in a minority of cases do member
countries fail to comply with DSB rulings.50 Observers differ on how they
characterize the outcomes of disputes, but according to the WTO, member
43. Davey, supra note 15, at 72.
44. James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 248, 250 (2001); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 803 (2001) (“The establishment of the Appellate Body made the
system more judicial.”).
45. See infra Parts I.B. & D.
46. DSU, supra note 6, art. 6.
47. The appellate process is detailed in DSU articles 16 & 17.
48. See supra note 42.
49. DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.1. The DSU suggests that there is flexibility in determining a
“reasonable period of time,” but as a guideline, suggests that it “should not exceed 15 months from
the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.” Id. art. 21.3(c). However, during this
time the member country must file status reports to the DSB. Id. art. 21.6.
50. At the end of 2014, 488 disputes had been brought at the WTO. Resolving Trade Disputes
Between WTO Members, WTO, at 3, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/dispute_brochure20y_e.pdf [hereinafter Resolving Trade Disputes]. More than half of those disputes were resolved without the involvement of a dispute settlement panel. Id. at 6. Even those disputes that
resulted in findings of violations generally were resolved through compliance and settlement; in
2010, only seventeen disputes resulted in authorization to retaliate through suspension of concessions. Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn, Introduction: Trade Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement: A Multi-disciplinary Analysis, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 10 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010) (“Of the so far
seventeen authorizations to retaliate, eight were granted to developing countries and only in one
instance did a developing country actually implement the retaliation . . . .”).
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countries party to a dispute comply with DSB rulings at a rate of ninety percent.51 A study of decisions over the course of the WTO’s first ten years
found that “[a]pparent more-or-less-full compliance” was achieved in 67.1%
of the cases where a violation was found, but that only 8.9% of cases resulted
in “[u]nabashed noncompliance.”52 Still, noncompliance happens.53
In the event that recommendations or rulings are not implemented
“within a reasonable period of time,”54 the DSU allows for compensation
to—or suspension of concessions by—the complaining country.55 There is
no provision for the award of financial compensation.56 Rather, compensation in the DSU describes the reduction of tariffs on specific goods by the
violating country57 and is a rarely-used remedy.58 Retaliatory countermeasures are the preferred remedy for countries complaining of ongoing trade violations.59 Retaliation refers to the imposition of countermeasures, determined through arbitration and subsequent approval by the DSB after which

51. Resolving Trade Disputes, supra note 50, at 7.
52. Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, A Comment on Compliance with WTO Decisions, in THE
WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 773 (Merit E. Janow
et al. eds., 2008). The remaining cases were characterized as resulting in partial compliance (eight
cases out of seventy-nine), debatable compliance (six cases out of seventy-nine), and sleazy settlements (five cases out of seventy-nine). Id.
53. See id.; see also Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 794.
54. DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.3 (requiring the violating member to inform the DSB of its
intentions regarding implementation of recommendations, and describing a reasonable period of
time as one proposed by the member and approved by the DSB, a time period agreed upon by the
parties to the dispute, or, if necessary, a time period determined through binding arbitration). In
practice, arbitrators take into account the nature of the implementing action that is required when
setting a reasonable time. Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 35, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/13 (Aug. 19, 2005) (“Legislative action will, as a general rule, require more time than regulatory rule-making, which in turn
will normally need more time than implementation that can be achieved by means of an administrative decision.”).
55. DSU, supra note 6, art. 2.
56. Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 152 (“[C]ash transfers typically are not available as
countermeasures in WTO disputes.”). In contrast, the recently-released draft of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership agreement provides for financial damages as at least a temporary remedy for violations.
Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, art. 28.20(7),
(10) & (11), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/28.Dispute-Settlement-Chapter.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
57. For example, Japan reduced tariff rates on certain goods pending full implementation of
the Appellate Body report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. See generally Appellate Body
Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Feb. 14, 1997).
58. See Bryan Mercurio, Why Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 315, 325 (2009) (discussing the rare use
of compensation as a remedy for trade violations, likely because the noncompliant country is responsible for implementing the compensatory system, removing control from the complaining country that already has reason to mistrust the noncompliant country).
59. Id.
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the complaining country may impose approved countermeasures against the
noncompliant member. Countermeasures take the form of suspensions of
concessions made under the WTO and ancillary agreements.60
The DSU provides guidelines about what type of concessions may be
suspended, how to determine the appropriate value for countermeasures, and
the duration of the measures.61 Countermeasures are tied in size to the harm
suffered by a complaining country and constrained in time to counter prospective harms and cease upon compliance.62 The DSB may authorize a complaining country to suspend concessions or other obligations to the noncompliant member under the WTO Agreement at a level that is “equivalent” to
the nullification or impairment of benefits that was suffered with the initial
violation.63 Despite the requirement of equivalence, the countermeasures are
imposed prospectively, and do not redress losses from past violations.64 In
addition, according to the DSU, countermeasures are meant to be temporary,
applied only until measures are taken to bring the violator country into compliance or until another satisfactory solution is found.65 Countermeasures are
generally meant to be applied in the same trade sector as the violation, so that
an unfair tariff on goods will be countered with higher tariff levels against
other, imported goods from the noncompliant country.66 However, complaining countries may seek to impose countermeasures on goods or under
agreements not implicated by the initial violation.

60. DSU, supra note 6, arts. 2, 22.2.
61. See generally id. art. 22.
62. Id. art. 22.4.
63. Id.
64. The time lag between a complaint and the potential imposition of sanctions has frequently
been criticized for allowing a “free pass” for temporary violations. John H. Jackson, The Case of
the World Trade Organization, 84 INT’L AFF. 437, 452 (2008) (describing the three year “free pass”
countries have to violate the WTO because the dispute settlement process takes at least three years,
and any damages are prospective in nature); Hyo-young Lee, “Remedying” the Remedy System for
Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO: Reconsidering its Retrospective Aspect, ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L
HEALTH L. POL’Y 423 (2015); Note, (In)efficient Breach of International Trade Law: The State of
the “Free Pass” after China’s Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 HARV. L. REV. 602 (2011) (discussing the time lag between a country’s breach and the imposition of remedies and potential underdeterrence of breach as a result).
65. DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.8 provides:
The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be
applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement
has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory
solution is reached.
66. If the complaining party considers it “not practicable or effective” to retaliate within the
same sector, it may ask to retaliate against another sector within the same agreement. Id. art.
22.3(b).; The DSU defines “sector” to mean:
(i) with respect to goods, all goods;
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Cross-retaliation is the imposition of countermeasures under other
agreements, and the DSB may approve such measures if it determines that
retaliation under the same agreement is “not practicable or effective” and if
“circumstances are serious enough.”67 The measure of these standards depends on the level of trade affected by the violation, its importance to the
complaining country, and the “broader economic elements . . . and consequences” of suspending concessions.68 As discussed below, a complaining
country with a small economy is likely to suffer when it imposes high tariffs,
as the tariffs result in higher prices for its domestic consumers of targeted
goods or higher prices for intermediate goods that domestic industries depend
on. In contrast, a noncompliant country with a large economy will not be so
affected by such countermeasures imposed by a small trading partner. As a
result, “practicable” has been understood as a measure of whether there was
sufficient trade in the given sector to impose a sufficient retaliatory countermeasure.69 The term “effective” has been interpreted to mean that a prospective countermeasure is likely to induce compliance by the member targeted
by the countermeasure.70
Thus, a violation with respect to goods may be countered with the suspension of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement or GATS.71 This has
been seen as an increasingly attractive way to counter perceived deficiencies
in typical retaliatory countermeasures.72

(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current “Services Sectoral Classification List” which identifies such sectors; (14)
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the categories of
intellectual property rights covered in Section 1, or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4,
or Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or Part
IV of the Agreement on TRIPS.
Id. art. 22.3(f).
67. DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.3(c).
68. Id. art. 22.3(d).
69. See, e.g., Arbitrator Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, ¶ 5.460, WTO Doc. 8WT/DS267/ARB/1 (adopted Aug. 31,
2009); Arbitrator Decision, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution Of Bananas, ¶ 70, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter “Arbitration Decision, EC–Bananas III”] (“[T]he ordinary meaning of ‘practicable’ is ‘available or useful
in practice; able to be used’ or ‘inclined or suited to action as opposed to speculation etc.’ In other
words, an examination of the ‘practicability’ of an alternative suspension concerns the question
whether such an alternative is available for application in practice as well as suited for being used
in a particular case.”).
70. See, e.g., Arbitration Decision, EC–Bananas III, ¶ 72 (“[T]he term ‘effective’ connotes
‘powerful in effect,’ ‘making a strong impression’, ‘having an effect or result’ . . . [allowing] the
party seeking suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and has the desired
result, namely to induce compliance by the Member which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent
measures into compliance with DSB rulings within a reasonable period of time.”).
71. See infra Part I.A.
72. See infra Part I.A.
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B. Countermeasure Critiques
Scholars and advocates for developing countries criticize traditional
WTO remedies as ineffective, unfair, and counter-productive, particularly for
developing countries.73 The perception that WTO remedies are ineffective
stems from the fact that, in disputes that proceed to the point of authorization
or imposition of remedial measures, the remedies have often not resulted in
compliance.74 Most disputes are settled along the way—and those that are
not settled before a panel or appellate body opinion is issued still have a likelihood of settling once a violation is found. Remedies, therefore, do not come
into play in most cases.75 As Steve Charnovitz explained in 2001, there is
disagreement about whether the failure of remedies to induce compliance indicates a lack of sufficiently sharp teeth or that trade agreements are simply
fruitless in some circumstances.76
The argument that WTO remedies are ineffective because they lack
sharp teeth is based on the idea that there is systematic underdeterrence of
violations. Not every violation results in a WTO complaint, for reasons of
costs, both political and fiscal. Remedies do not contemplate compensation
for past violations, including violations after the complaint or even after an
adverse ruling; and because the benefits to a violator country may accrue in
advantages against multiple countries, remedies will only be applied with respect to those countries that have filed a complaint. If a lack of sharp teeth
is the problem, then increased—or more carefully targeted—remedies may
result in greater compliance.
The other possibility is that “sharper” teeth are not enough to induce
compliance, because the threat of remedies plays a smaller role in countries’
compliance with the WTO than is typically theorized—particularly when
those theories analogize to domestic private law. Instead, this narrative posits
that diplomacy and the interests of mutual adherence to and global interests
in validity of the treaty tend to induce compliance in most cases.77 And, those

73. Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REV. 287 (2005) (examining reasons developing country members of WTO are discouraged from active engagement in dispute settlement by the
system’s rules and procedures).
74. See Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 796 (“In the three instances where sanctions were imposed (1 Bananas, 2 Hormones), little or no compliance has ensued. In the other two episodes
where sanctions were authorized (1 Bananas, 1 Aircraft), the winning country did not exercise its
rights.”).
75. This is not so different from domestic law, where the importance of remedies are nonetheless understood to derive from their importance in settlement negotiations.
76. The imagery in this characterization is Charnovitz’s, and perhaps reflects that a dispute
over bananas drove many of these observations. Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 796.
77. Horlick & Coleman, supra note 52, at 771 (starting their article with the premise that
“WTO Members normally comply with their WTO obligations”).
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cases that reach the remedies stage represent instances where countries’ preferences are strong enough that compliance is politically costly. Thus, it may
well be that in some instances, countries are unable or unwilling to comply
no matter the threatened—or imposed—remedy and regardless of whether
the reasons strike observers as objectively meritorious. One example of this
inability or unwillingness to comply regardless of costs is the hormones dispute between the United States and the European Union (“EU”).78 The
United States challenged European regulations banning sales of hormoneraised beef despite a lack of compelling scientific research showing a link
between hormones and cancer.79 On one hand, the European ban on imports
of beef-administered hormones can be characterized as the European Union’s
commitment to longstanding methods of food production and hesitancy to
take on risks absent long-term studies showing safety. On the other hand, the
measures may equally and plausibly be characterized as protectionist
measures on behalf of domestic and local food production that favor smaller
farms over larger, foreign, and potentially more efficient means of producing
food.80 In either case, the European Union was unwilling to amend its laws
following a finding of violation.81
If perfect compliance is impossible due to domestic pressure—regardless of whether the pressure results from deeply felt anxiety or protectionist
impulses—stronger remedies will not result in compliance. Instead, the potential benefit of harsh remedies, such as cross-retaliation, is that they serve
to identify such situations and their threat ensures compliance in those cases
that do not implicate such deeply held commitments to particular noncompliant measures. It is worth noting that for developing countries defending
against complaints by developed countries, political pressure outside the
scope of the WTO makes refusal to comply impossible. This pressure may
be due to dependence on foreign aid from the complaining country, for example.82 Therefore, it may be more accurate to say that in some cases,
78. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
79. Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 743, 753–54 (2004).
80. Id. at 766–76 (discussing United States’ claims that the hormones ban reflected protectionist interests rather than health concerns, an argument ultimately rejected by the Appellate Body of
the DSB).
81. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 253, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16,
1998) (finding violation); Arbitrator Decision, European Communities – Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WTO Docs. WT/DS26/ARB & WT/DS48/ARB (July 12,
1999) (finding the United States and Canada entitled to impose $125 million in sanctions against
the European Union). Similarly, U.S. laws against online gambling can be characterized as representing a moral judgment against gambling or as a result of capture by and protectionism on behalf
of gambling organizations within the United States.
82. Shaffer, Developing Country, supra note 10, at 178.
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stronger remedies imposed against developed countries will not result in
compliance. The informal pressure that is brought to bear on developing
countries makes deeply felt anxiety an unattainable luxury; they cannot afford not to comply.
Traditional trade retaliation is also criticized as being particularly ineffective when used by developing countries against developed countries.83
This is because, for example, tariffs on exports to a developing country generally have little effect on producers and exporters in the developed country—developing country markets are simply too small to impact an industry
that exports worldwide to many larger markets.84 At the same time, tarifftype countermeasures may have a strong, negative impact on consumers in
developing countries, as goods that have been subjected to high tariffs will
be sold at higher prices to offset the tariffs.85 These higher prices harm consumers in the complaining country.86 If the targeted goods are not of the type
directly sold to consumers, but instead are raw materials used in products
manufactured by domestic industries, tariffs may also be harmful to those
industries that depend on low-cost inputs.87
Another critique of WTO remedies is that they are unfair because of the
separation between those who receive the benefits of noncompliant laws and
those who are harmed by retaliatory measures.88 As discussed above, retaliatory tariffs often have unintended impacts on constituencies in the complaining country that are entirely unrelated to the dispute, such as consumers. In
addition, noncompliant country exporters whose goods are targeted with retaliatory tariffs are also often unrelated to those who benefit from the initial
measures. Tariffs are often imposed against goods in a different manufacturing sector than the one that benefitted from the initial violation, resulting in

83. Marco Bronckers & Freya Baetens, Reconsidering Financial Remedies in WTO Dispute
Settlement, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 281, 282 (2013); Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 404.
84. See Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 404 (“[T]here is no way of forcing developed
countries into compliance with their WTO obligations because any threat of retaliatory actions by
developing countries, say in the form of more trade restrictions, will not be effective. The size of
their own markets and the consequential limited effect of the punitive tariffs imposed on partner
countries and their firms may make threatened retaliatory trade action an insufficient deterrent.”).
85. See Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 282 (“[W]ith retaliation, members may easily
shoot themselves in the foot by making imports from the offending member more expensive.”).
86. Nevertheless, this may be a boon—albeit modest, due to the small market—to domestic
producers who are able to raise prices and capture more of the domestic market in the face of more
expensive imports.
87. See, e.g., Arbitrator Decision, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 5.153, WTO
Doc. WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009) (accepting Brazil’s position “that it would not be practicable or effective to seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in relation to imports of capital, intermediate and other essential inputs into Brazil’s economy”).
88. See Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 289 (critiquing current WTO remedies).
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harm to “innocent bystander” industries.89 For example, when the United
States sought and received approval to retaliate against the European Communities for their discriminatory treatment of bananas, the retaliatory tariffs
levied on “bath preparations, other than bath salts,” in addition to handbags,
bed linens, and coffee/tea makers.90 These industries—which suffered under
100% tariffs—were unrelated to any industries that may have gained from
the initial violations in the agricultural sector.91
Lastly, retaliatory countermeasures are criticized as counterproductive
because they increase trade barriers. The “solution” to one noncompliant
trade barrier is to impose a second in an unrelated area, increasing distortions
to free trade. Increasing the availability and imposition of cross-retaliation
and introducing financial damages have both been raised as potential means
to address these critiques of traditional remedies as ineffective, unfair, and
counter-productive.92 If the threat of cross-retaliation is more effective at
forcing compliance, then use of that threat will not result in further trade distortion. If, instead, intellectual property rights are in fact suspended, then one
would expect trade disruption in innovative and creative industries, as discussed below. Financial damages are attractive because they do not directly
distort trade. Payment does not come from an unrelated industry or impose
costs on consumers (except in their role as taxpayers). In addition, financial
damages could counter the unfairness critique of trade remedies if the money
is used to alleviate harms to the injured industry. This Section has explained
the critiques of traditional countermeasures from a compliance perspective,
though the possibility that remedies may be incapable of preventing breach
raises the other view of WTO remedies. The next Section, therefore, engages
the debate over the purpose of WTO remedies: whether they ought to be
crafted to induce total compliance or to allow for occasional breach—and if
so, under what circumstances.
C. Theories of Retaliation
Debate over the ideal amount and form of WTO remedies turns on the
extent to which the goal of trade remedies is compliance-inducing versus
compensatory. That is, whether the threat of retaliation ought to deter breach
entirely or whether retaliation ought to merely reflect the cost to complaining

89. In this sense, a noncompliant country’s decision to continue its violation is a decision to
transfer gains from the retaliated-against industry to the industry that is the beneficiary of the violation.
90. Scott D. Andersen & Justine Blanchet, The United States’ Experience and Practice in Suspending WTO Obligations, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 235, 238 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010).
91. Id.
92. See infra Parts I.C.2 & I.D.
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countries, allowing potential violators to calculate the cost of breach and
choose whether to violate trade obligations. The remedies provided in the
WTO admit either justification. The principle critique of the WTO framework—that the WTO favors developed countries with stronger economies—
does not necessarily favor either compliance-inducing or compensatory
views of remedies. On the one hand, developing and least developed countries are viewed as already compelled to comply, while developed countries
are able to flout the WTO rules. Compliance-inducement is therefore seen
as a way of ensuring the developed countries are not getting away with something that developing and least developed countries cannot. On the other
hand, if occasional breach by developed countries is a foregone conclusion,
a method that allows for compensation may be appealing—in fact, the direct
award of financial damages would be of great benefit from this perspective.
Both theories may point to the benefits of cross-retaliation, albeit for different
reasons.
1. The Conflicting Purposes of Countermeasures: Compliance or
Compensation?
The increased interest in remedying WTO violations by suspending—
or threatening suspension of—the intellectual property rights protection required by the TRIPS Agreement comes from proponents of both a compliance and compensatory view of WTO remedies. This interest stems from the
difficulty of crafting appropriate and effective remedies as well as from a lack
of agreement on what “appropriate” or “effective” mean in this context. This
discourse fits into the broader, ongoing debate about the purposes of remedial
measures at the WTO,93 both as a descriptive and prescriptive matter.94 Some
scholars suggest that the main objective of the WTO Agreement is compliance,95 and that this purpose is intended to dictate appropriate remedies. Un-

93. In one arbitration, the arbitrators lamented that “it is not completely clear what role is to
be played by the suspension of obligations in the DSU and a large part of the conceptual debate that
took place in these proceedings could have been avoided if a clear ‘object and purpose’ were identified.” Arbitrator Decision, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶
6.4, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (Aug. 31, 2004). It may be particularly frustrating to arbitrators that conceptual debates are left unsettled because of the non-precedential status of determinations, meaning that prior decisions do not decide the issue for them, and their determination will
not govern the decisions of future arbitration proceedings.
94. Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: What Is the
Goal of suspending WTO Obligations?, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION
IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 34, 35 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010).
95. See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 149 (terming this the “compliance theory” of
countermeasures).
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der this theory, remedies associated with violations should be tailored to induce maximum—or perfect—compliance.96 Others suggest that perfect compliance is impossible, and that remedies should seek to reduce noncompliance to situations analogous to “efficient breach” in contract law, pointing to
the DSU’s requirement that retaliation be “equivalent” to the impairment suffered by a complaining country in arguing for compensatory-type remedies.97
These different viewpoints dictate different interpretations of appropriate retaliation for violations of the WTO Agreement.98 Whether termed an “efficient breach”99 (a problematic term given that trade distortions are generally
seen as inefficient from a global welfare perspective) or framed as a method
of “pricing noncompliance,”100 the second view generally counsels for lesser
remedies than the first.
Those who suggest that compliance is the primary purpose of remedies
point to the centrality of compliance to the functioning of the WTO Agreement, in general, as well as its incorporation into the Dispute Settlement
Agreement’s stated purpose, specifically.101 In one sense, the complianceinducement view of WTO remedies flows quite plainly from an understanding of the purpose and role of the WTO Agreement. The premise of the WTO
is that world welfare will increase with lower barriers to trade, but that unilaterally eliminating protectionist laws in any one country is often politically
unpalatable. The WTO carries out the work of the GATT, under which members tie these politically unpalatable changes to new trade opportunities resulting from reciprocal obligations undertaken by other members.
Collective compliance is central to the WTO Agreement’s continued legitimacy. It follows, according to this argument, that the dispute settlement
process should be geared towards enforcing compliance through its rulings

96. See, e.g., Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 290–91 (arguing that compliance is the
main purpose of remedies because it allows for “security and predictability” of the multilateral trading system, consistent with DSU Art. 3 (2)); Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 1 (“Given the imbalances
in trade and economic power amongst WTO Members, the central issue is whether suspending
TRIPS obligations can do a significantly better job than traditional retaliation in facilitating compliance by powerful WTO Members.”); see also Davey, supra note 15, at 68 (suggesting that enforcement is the principal goal of the dispute settlement system in GATT).
97. See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 150–51 (noting that the “equivalence” standard
for determining countermeasures is not consistent with a compliance-inducing purpose).
98. See id. at 162 (“Economic analysis can say little about ‘optimal’ retaliation in the WTO
system absent a theory of what retaliation is supposed to accomplish.”).
99. Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 243.
100. Brewster, supra note 16, at 265.
101. See Jackson, supra note 15, at 60 (noting that WTO members are legally obligated to comply with the findings of dispute proceedings and thus “specific performance” is required of members); Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 291 (arguing that full compliance with WTO obligations allows for security and predictability of the multilateral trading system).
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and remedies. Under this view, it is the threat of retaliation that keeps countries from resorting to trade restrictions.102 As Kyle Bagwell has noted, to
achieve compliance, the long-term costs of retaliation must outweigh the
short-term gains from cheating.103 Bagwell nonetheless suggests that the difficulty of calculating damages makes it unappealing to use WTO remedies
this way.104 In contrast, some, like Marco Bronckers and Freya Baetens, see
the difficulty of calculating the effects of initial violations and potential retaliatory measures as a strength of the compliance inducement view. They
argue that one reason a compliance-inducing view of WTO remedies is preferable is because it absolves arbitrators from having to make precise judgments about the complex financial implications of remedies.105 Thus, the
potential for disproportionately large retaliatory measures offers the advantage that it need not be precisely calculated—the whole point is to make
the retaliation more painful than the initial violation was beneficial.
For those who support a compliance-inducing view of remedies, strong
retaliatory measures are also seen as a means of balancing or neutralizing the
portions of the DSU that otherwise result in undercompensation for harms.
The delays in instituting remedial measures and their solely prospective application mean that they rarely meet—let alone exceed—the benefits drawn
by the violating country or the injury suffered by the complaining country.106
The text of the DSU offers some support for the primacy of compliance
in the dispute settlement process. First, the stated objective of the DSU is the
removal of measures inconsistent with the covered agreements.107 In addition, the provisions declaring that countermeasures are meant to last only until compliance is achieved, which supports the idea that the DSU ultimately

102. Or, to be more precise, threats of retaliation enforce compliance when reputational costs,
reciprocity, and other considerations are not sufficient.
103. Kyle Bagwell, Remedies in the World Trade Organization: An Economic Perspective, in
THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 733, 741 (Merit
E. Janow et al. eds., 2008).
104. Bagwell does not advocate for compliance-inducing retaliatory measures, explaining that,
while theoretically appealing, discerning an optimal level of retaliation is complex due to uncertainty about the losses caused by initial violations, the benefits and costs of retaliatory measures for
the member countries directly involved in the conflict, and the third-party effects of retaliationcaused trade distortions. Id. at 750–51.
105. Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 307 (explaining that one need not be precise about
damages in order to induce compliance).
106. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, World Trade Organization Sanctions, Implementation, and Retaliation, 48 EMPIRICAL ECON. 715, 715 (2014) (presenting a study
showing that the WTO-violative “Byrd Amendment” increased share returns of U.S. companies
benefited by the subsidies that were larger than share declines experienced by firms targeted with
retaliatory tariffs and suggesting that this diminished pressure on U.S. policymakers to strike down
the noncompliant measure).
107. DSU, supra note 6, art 3.7; Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 804 (“The tenor of these provisions is that a suspension operates to drive compliance.”); Mercurio, supra note 58, at 321.
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envisions member countries modifying their laws in order to comply with
rulings.108
This stated purpose of the WTO Agreement and its dispute settlement
process, however, is not evident in the provisions governing the calculation
of remedies. As Joost Pauwelyn explains, while the ultimate purpose of the
WTO dispute settlement process is to induce compliance,109 the DSU provisions for countermeasures do not appear geared towards that goal.110 Or, in
the words of Gene Grossman and Alan Sykes, “If the goal of the system is to
ensure compliance, therefore, its design, at least as interpreted in the decisions to date, is hard to square with that objective.”111 The provisions that
supporters of a compliance theory rely upon describe the general purpose of
the DSU, but need not require that retaliatory countermeasures be calibrated
so as to maximize compliance. Instead, as Pauwelyn and others have noted,
the level—and forward-looking nature—of countermeasures allowed by the
DSU suggest that they are meant to serve a compensatory or trade-balancing
purpose.112 In particular, the DSU requires that the level of countermeasures
be “equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment” imposed by the
violation and thus tied to the harm suffered by a complaining party.113 The
delay before countermeasures are imposed and the proportionality requirement may result in undercompensation and underdeterrence, leaving the impression that compliance—another form of deterrence—may not be the driving force behind the calculation of remedies.
Compliance theory dictates a different measure of remedies than compensatory theories of remedies—and therefore has been criticized because it
is not consistent with the proper level of countermeasures dictated by the
108. DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.8; see also Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 804–08 (arguing that
there was a transformation from the rebalancing function contemplated under GATT and the compliance-inducement function of remedies under the WTO).
109. Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—Toward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 343 (2000) (citing various arbitration
proceedings that state the WTO’s commitment to compliance).
110. Id. at 343–44.
111. Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 150–51.
112. Countermeasures are forward-looking in that they do not take into account harm done before the WTO has judged a measure to be in violation.
113. “The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations . . . shall be equivalent to
the level of the nullification or impairment.” DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.4. Provisions in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) concerning appropriate remedies for rectifying illegal subsidies are similar: they are to be “commensurate with the degree and nature of the
adverse effects determined to exist.” Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art.
7.9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1869 U.N.T.S. 14, 21 [hereinafter SCM]. Calculation of the “level of the nullification or impairment” is unsurprisingly often disputed in litigation and a topic of discussion in academic literature.
See, e.g., Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 137–41 (discussing the parties’ arguments in Upland
Cotton about whether countermeasures should be based on the lost trade volume for the harmed
country or the value of the subsidy granted by the noncompliant country).
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DSU. If compliance is the goal of retaliatory measures, the appropriate level
of countermeasures should be tied to the gains of the noncompliant country
to negate incentives for noncompliance. The countermeasures could even be
punitive in nature, because larger potential remedies ought to induce greater
compliance.114 Cross-retaliation is attractive from a compliance view because intellectual property-reliant industries are seen as having strong lobbies
that are able to put pressure on a noncompliant government. The harms to
such industries from suspending intellectual property rights also may be large
and diffuse, making the pressure on government not just acute, but also
strong.115
In contrast to the compliance theory, those who argue that the purpose
of WTO remedies is compensation point to the allowed level of countermeasures that is based on the damage done to the complaining country and on
rebalancing trade.116 A number of scholars have embraced the idea of countermeasures serving a compensatory purpose. Alan Sykes argues that a view
of WTO remedies as compensatory is consistent with the text of the DSU.117
Moreover, Sykes argues that it is economically desirable to allow countries
to breach the agreement in certain circumstances, and that these circumstances—analogous to an “efficient breach” in contract law—are best identified by a remedies regime that imposes compensatory damages.118 Together
with Eric Posner, Sykes explains that international law has historically been
self-enforcing, with breaches subject to unilateral retaliation and no legal
oversight.119 It is only relatively recently that agreements, such as the WTO,
provide for remedial systems with judicial oversight.120 The WTO remedies,
Sykes and Posner argue, reflect the economic logic of the “efficient breach”
in contract law by recognizing both that the underlying laws embodied in the
WTO may, at times, be inefficient,121 and that sometimes breach is inevitable
and the remedial system should recognize this reality.122 The argument that

114. Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 150.
115. Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 2 (“A withdrawal of obligations under TRIPS can generally
be expected to have a significant impact on key industries and thereby provide a strong incentive to
industrialized countries to comply with WTO rulings.”).
116. Pauwelyn, supra note 94, at 38.
117. Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347, 353 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard
Quick eds., 2000); Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 243; Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at
149.
118. Sykes, supra note 117, at 351.
119. Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 245.
120. Id. at 257.
121. Id. at 245. In other words, laws embodied in the WTO may fail to promote national or
global welfare.
122. Id. at 246.
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occasional breach is inevitable for political reasons does not mean that breach
is “efficient” from a global economic perspective, but compensatory-type
remedies will ensure that it only occurs when a country’s idiosyncratic values
are held sufficiently strongly, an occurrence perhaps better-termed “unavoidable” or “expedient” breach. Setting rules for breach allows countries some
certainty about what the costs of various choices will be and allow for “legalized noncompliance.”123
Offering another take on compensatory damages, Rachel Brewster explains that “pricing compliance,” or using dispute resolution to set the cost of
breach, may be an attractive feature of the WTO Agreement’s strong dispute
resolution procedures.124 In other words, “governments may create formal
dispute resolution systems to lower the costs of deviation rather than to raise
them.”125 This argument contrasts with the compliance theory viewpoint that
full compliance strengthens the WTO Agreement. Instead, Brewster suggests that countries are only willing to submit to the strong provisions of the
WTO Agreement because of the option of breach. According to this view,
the success of the WTO is based on its option to opt out.
Efficient breach in any context has its critics.126 In the WTO context,
additional criticism of the compensatory view of remedies is that it may be
123. Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 253.
124. See Brewster, supra note 16, at 265 (“[The] choice of a dispute resolution system is often
a purposeful effort to limit remedies to the harm caused, and thus to price noncompliance rather
than to sanction it.”).
125. Id. at 302. Brewster, together with Adam Chilton, has also delved deeper into dispute
resolution procedures to show that one of the greatest predictors of compliance with DSB rulings in
the United States is whether the compliance must be achieved through congressional action—in
which case it is less likely to occur. See Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance:
Why and When the United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (2014)
(“[W]ho within the government supplies compliance is the best predictor of whether and when the
U.S. government complies with WTO rulings. The need for congressional involvement in the compliance process both decreases the likelihood of compliance and delays compliance more than any
other factor.”).
126. In the context of contract law, using expectation damages as a means of encouraging efficient breach may suffer from a problem of overreliance—where the harmed party knows there is a
chance the other party will breach, but because compensation is certain, will proceed in reliance on
the other parties’ performance. Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL
J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980). In the international context, this argument would suggest that countries
who foresee long-term breach from others should adjust industrial policy accordingly, rather than
relying on compensatory measures or the potential for financial settlements. A. Mitchell Polinsky
explains that efficient breach theory makes sense to push the breaching party to behave efficiently,
but when we have reason to be concerned about the harmed party’s incentives, other remedies such
as restitution will spur more efficient behavior. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 38 (2d ed. 1989). In the international context, Polinsky’s explanation suggests that expectation damages are likely a reasonable remedial choice because overreliance is less
of a concern. The reason for this is that—unlike in the contract setting—the party that is harmed
(domestic industry) is not the same party that decides to bring suit (the government) nor, importantly, is it the same party that is benefited by retaliatory measures. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the fairness critique of WTO remedies.
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available to wealthy, developed countries as a way to buy themselves out of
their obligations while conferring favors on their strongest industries in the
form of WTO-violating policies. This is because potential retaliatory
measures fall on other industries,127 have lesser impact when imposed by developing countries with small markets,128 and may even take the form of settlement payments, in which case the cost is dispersed over taxpayers while
the benefits are concentrated on industries with the strongest lobbies. In this
way, developed countries might be under—encouraged to comply. Thus,
even assuming that some cases may present situations where countries are
unwilling or unable to comply, a compensatory theory of countermeasures is
likely to result in breach more frequently than is desirable. Even those who
argue for compensatory remedies agree that instances of breach ought to be
minimized. The likelihood that developed countries might buy their way out
of their obligations is exacerbated by the delays that are allowed for in instituting countermeasures and the prospective nature of countermeasures. Because much of the damage to the complaining country remains uncompensated, there may be undercompensation, resulting in higher levels of breach
than a true compensatory regime would predict.
This critique of a compensatory theory of WTO remedies is supported
by the fact that developing countries generally have complied with WTO rulings, while the instances of noncompliance are generally attributable to developed countries. At the same time, what it misses, when discussing the
ways that current WTO damages do not mimic expectation damages in contract law—that is, they do not fully compensate for harms—is that these
breaches are still fairly infrequent. One explanation is that there are other
costs to developed countries of exercising the option to breach. These are the
reputational costs that have traditionally been seen as the force behind compliance, particularly for treaties with less in the way of formalized dispute
resolution.129 From a compensatory damages perspective, cross-retaliation is
appealing because it solves some of the problems associated with the ineffectiveness of developing country complaints due to the size of the market
and it may benefit consumers through the potential for lower prices on innovative goods, at least in the short term.

127. See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1861–65 (2002) (discussing factors that affect the importance of reputational
costs in state decisions to breach international obligations); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones,
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002) (discussing the complex factors that affect reputational costs of breach in international law).
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2. The Appeal of Financial Damages
Financial damages have some appeal to scholars from both camps, and
the cross-retaliation cases that occupy the next Section may be cast as one
way of attaining many of the benefits of financial damages through settlement. Scholars from both camps—those who support the compliance theory
of remedies and those who argue for compensatory remedies—have suggested that financial damages may solve some of the structural problems associated with retaliatory countermeasures. One benefit is that financial compensation does not result in greater trade distortion in the way that traditional
countermeasures do.130 A separate but related benefit is that financial remedies solve the problem of suspending concessions to industries that did not
benefit from the initial violation and are merely located in the noncompliant
country.131 In addition, the option of financial remedies might benefit weaker
WTO members who have difficulty imposing effective countermeasures because those measures generally inflict greater harm on the imposing country
than the noncompliant country.132 Financial damages, in contrast, provide a
concrete benefit to a harmed country.
Financial damages have some of the same potential problems as retaliation. For example, the counterargument to the optimistic prediction that financial damages might give weaker WTO members greater recourse to remedies is that the relative ease of paying financial damages—as opposed to the
harm and subsequent lobbying that occur when an “innocent” industry is targeted by remedies—will result in a greater number of breaches.133 If
breaches become too common, the norm of compliance will be softened,
threatening the strength and value of the multilateral agreement. Additionally, the potential for monetary compensation could make WTO litigation

130. See Mercurio, supra note 58, at 329 (“[T]he most attractive feature of financial compensation is that, like trade compensation, it is not trade restrictive, and thus does not conflict with WTO
principles.”).
131. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—
Toward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 345–46 (2000) (“Pecuniary compensation would . . . make more economic sense than both the suspension of concessions and a compensatory lifting of trade barriers in mostly unrelated sectors . . . .”).
132. See id. (“[Financial damages] would . . . be easier to monitor and more accessible for
weaker WTO members.”); William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement,
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119, 126 (2009) (“[O]nly a small group of powerful countries can be expected to effectively use retaliation. The obvious possible remedy is to allow a prevailing party to
choose between suspension of concessions and receipt of a periodic monetary payment.”).
133. See Davey, supra note 132, at 126 (“The system would have to be designed to avoid the
possibility that rich members could effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not available to the poor members. That result might be accomplished by tying the amount of fines to the
size of the member’s economy or otherwise providing for a sliding scale that would minimize “discrimination” against poor members.”).
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more appealing by driving conflicts that are now resolved politically into legal proceedings and encouraging rent-seeking behavior over diplomacy.
Despite the appeal of financial damages as a solution to the difficulties
associated with crafting a remedial scheme at the WTO, it has not gained
traction in international negotiations. This may be because those negotiations
have effectively stalled overall.134 Only recently have financial remedies
made their way into some of the multi-lateral trade agreements that are under
negotiation—primarily those in which the United States is a party.135 The
negotiated draft of the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership provides for the
payment of monetary compensation until the parties have settled or the violator country has brought its laws into compliance.136 It remains to be seen
if these types of provisions will become common in regional treaties and gain
adherence internationally.
D. Intellectual Property in Trade Agreements and the Making of IP
Hostages
Cross-retaliation for WTO violations through suspension of intellectual
property rights has the potential to bridge the compliance-compensation debate on remedies and to provide a path to financial damages. Of course, this
was not the intention of including intellectual property law standards in the
WTO Agreement. Instead, attempts to harmonize intellectual property laws
through the TRIPS Agreement are meant to encourage businesses to produce
and sell goods globally, increase investment in developing economies and
open new markets for innovative corporations.137 Absent these protections,
companies would be hesitant to expand into foreign markets because of the

134. Takemasa Sekine, Financial Compensation in Trade Dispute Settlements: Can the Free
Trade Agreement Experiment be Successful?, 10 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 465,
467 (2015) (pointing out that financial compensation has not yet materialized as a remedy under the
WTO); World Trade Talks End in Collapse, BBC NEWS, (July 29, 2008, 10:46 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/7531099.stm.
135. Sekine, supra note 134, at 465–66.
136. Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, art.
28.20.7,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/28.-Dispute-Settlement-Chapter.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016). In this draft, there is a cap on monetary
compensation set at fifty percent of the level of benefits the panel has determined may be suspended
in retaliation, and a requirement that the suspension not last more than a year unless the complaining
country agrees to an extension. Id. art. 28.20.7, 10.
137. Rajec, supra note 33, 153 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of increased uniformity in
global patent law). The premise that uniform IP laws are beneficial to developing countries is contested, and some of the scholars who support cross-retaliation support it in part because it allows a
path for lower levels of IP enforcement. This Article argues that cross-retaliation is an ill-suited
instrument to decrease TRIPS requirements for developing countries. However, the very potential
that IP rights—supposedly more protected than previously because of the WTO Agreement—might
be threatened by their association with it serves as an example of how countries’ IP and trade interests do not always fit seamlessly together, although they are aligned in theory.
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threat of copying. Minimum required levels of intellectual property laws in
countries party to TRIPS lower the transaction costs associated with operating in different legal environments and provide a baseline for IP rights protection. However, with the possibility of cross-retaliation under the TRIPS
Agreement, the strength of those rights is challenged. Nevertheless, the use
of cross-retaliation has some appeal from a trade perspective.
Patent protection is a time-limited right to exclude that governments
grant to inventors who disclose their inventions.138 This patent grants protection in exchange for disclosure of inventions with the assumption that patent holders may profit from producing or licensing the invention, a way of
rewarding those who engage in commercially desirable innovation while
benefiting the public through access to the technology—likely at a premium
price before the patent expires—and as a part of the public domain following
its expiration.139 Those arguing for changes in the strength of patent protection or remedies associated with infringement often reference the tradeoff
between protection and access.140 These tradeoffs and balances, discussed
below, are not the ones that drive discussions of the potential role of crossretaliation through suspension of intellectual property rights. Instead, the potential role for cross-retaliation has been measured by the ways it may be able
to address structural problems in WTO remedies, generally.

138. In the United States, the right of Congress to grant patents “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” is enshrined in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
139. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989), reprinted in MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33–34 (1998) (reasoning that courts expect the right of exclusion
to provide incentives for individuals to invest in research and disclose their inventions, thereby benefiting the public); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 195–97 (2009) (describing how
the patent system solves the public goods problem by granting inventors time limited, exclusive
rights to control their invention); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (determining that the exclusive rights granted to inventors is a limitation society accepts in the name of increased innovation); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2004) (arguing that the protections offered to
inventors create rewards for continued innovation by eliminating the fear that a product may be
appropriated by a competitor).
140. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT (2009); Burk & Lemley, supra note 139; Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Anna
B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
43 (2012) (suggesting patentable subject matter doctrine as potential policy lever for calibrating
patent scope); Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
207 (2011) (suggesting two new patent forms to mitigate the social costs of traditional patents and
increase access by subsequent inventors); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur
Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 742–48 (2012) (suggesting that courts weigh the public interest
in encouraging innovation and promoting access when determining the appropriateness of the remedy of a permanent injunction).
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The threat of cross-retaliation through TRIPS suspension has been welcomed by many as a way of evening the playing field between developed and
developing countries to increase compliance.141 It is also a potential way to
effect a transfer—a method of allowing for financial damages that are not
provided for in the WTO.142 Because the industries in developed countries
generally value intellectual property rights highly,143 remedies that target
these industries theoretically will result in the strongest lobbying for bringing
laws into compliance.144 Moreover, some that support greater use of crossretaliation under TRIPS suggest that where noncompliance continues, suspension of IP rights may have some benefits.145 For example, domestic industries in the complaining country will be able to enter the market for a drug
earlier than expected if patent rights go unenforced. As a result, domestic
consumers will gain access to medication for a lower cost. As Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal explain, cross-retaliation under TRIPS has the
dual benefits that it “inflict[s] loss or pain swiftly on the party being retaliated
against” and is “beneficial to the country taking the action.”146
The competing narratives of remedial purpose may appear reconcilable
on the issue of cross-retaliation, particularly in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. Retaliation against a violation, such as granting illegal subsidies under
the GATT, through intellectual property rights suspension exacts a high price

141. See supra note 96.
142. See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 161. Grossman and Sykes note that the threat of
cross-retaliation might:
[Result in a] transfer of rents from interest groups in the violator country to the complaining nation. If so, it may have the nice property that it is much closer to a ‘transfer’ than
traditional trade sanctions, which may make it relatively attractive. Indeed, if TRIPS
retaliation could be orchestrated in such a way as to avoid damaging innovation incentives (or other valuable interests served by intellectual property rights) . . . then it might
dominate trade sanctions quite broadly.
Id.
143. The importance of intellectual property protection to developed countries was central to
the creation of the TRIPS Agreement and its inclusion in the WTO. Antony Taubman, Thematic
Review: Negotiating “Trade-Related Aspects” of Intellectual Property Rights, in THE MAKING OF
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 15,
19 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015); see also Macey, supra note 37, at 351 (describing the developing countries as “clearly not the demandeurs in [the TRIPS] negotiation); Brewster, supra note 11, at 49 (“[Intellectual property-dependent industries] are politically mobilized
groups with the lobbying power to significantly influence national trade policies.”).
144. Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 2 (“Affected industries are likely to lobby their respective
(non-complying) governments to do everything necessary to avoid such suspensions in the first
place . . . .”); Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 403.
145. Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 3 (“[S]uspending IP protection may have positive welfare
effects for a (developing) economy, especially in education and health.” (emphasis omitted)); Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 407 (suggesting that reducing intellectual property protection
will make countries better off).
146. Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 405–06.

RajecFinalBookProof

2016]

11/3/2016 4:57 PM

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE

199

for violations with little downside for the complaining country.147 As a result,
cross-retaliation is attractive to compliance proponents. For example, India,
together with other developing countries,148 has proposed that it be allowed
to cross-retaliate without a showing that other remedies are not practicable
and effective.149
At the same time, cross-retaliation proves attractive to many proponents
of a compensatory justice theory of remedies—when properly calculated.150
Cross-retaliation is seen as potentially solving some of the problems associated with remedies that are unrelated to allowing occasional breach. For example, the inability of weaker countries to retaliate is problematic under either theory of remedies. Cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement has
the potential to solve this problem, and thus may also solve the problem of
over-encouraging breach.151 In addition, it may lead to financial settlements—thus using a property rule of damages to force the noncompliant
country to reveal how much it values the violation.152 This characteristic fits
in well with a compensatory justice theory of remedies, though not with a
view focused on increased compliance.
Many voices have therefore supported the idea of increased use and
availability of cross-retaliation under TRIPS. However, it has not proved to
be a panacea in practice—albeit with a small sample size. In all three cases
where cross-retaliation through IP rights suspension has been authorized, it
147. Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 161 (“In past arbitrations, the goal of complaining
nations seeking cross-retaliation rights, of course, has been an authorization to retaliate under
TRIPS.”).
148. The proposal was made on behalf of Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries Proposals on DSU, WTO Doc.
TN/DS/W/19 (Oct. 9, 2002).
149. See id. at 2. The proposal suggested that a new paragraph 3bis be added to Article 22 of
the DSU providing:
Notwithstanding the principles and procedures contained in paragraph 3, in a dispute
in which the complaining party is a developing-country Member and the other party,
which has failed to bring its measures into consistence with the Covered Agreements is
a developed-country Member, the complainant shall have the right to seek authorization
for suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to any or all sectors under
any covered agreements.
Id.
150. For a discussion of calculation, see Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 158.
151. Not all commentators see such potential in cross-retaliation—some find it barbarously unfair and likely to greatly harm the noncompliant country beyond the harm it imposed. One suggested
that “this hyper-creative form of retaliation . . . seems excessive,” violating “the biblical injunction
[of] . . . an eye for an eye,” and that seeking ever “more cruel and unusual forms of sanctions can
only lead to barbarism.” Alan Wm. Wolff, Remedy in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO:
GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 783, 798 (Merit E. Janow et
al. eds., 2008).
152. See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 94, at 34–73 (discussing property and liability rules in
the context of trade retaliation).

RajecFinalBookProof11_3_16

200

11/3/2016 4:57 PM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:169

has not been used. In one case, compliance is set to be achieved twenty years
after the dispute began—far longer than the three year free pass discussed in
traditional WTO disputes above. In a second case, the size and power disparities between the two countries, together with the practical difficulties of
taking advantage of rights suspension, have resulted in a stalemate. In the
last case, the authorization of cross-retaliation led to a financial settlement.
However, the financial settlement was reached with a country that has a
strong trading economy and a robust domestic industry ready to take up production of the patented goods at issue, countering the idea that cross-retaliation alone can address problems associated with economic and political disparity. These cases do not show a complete failure of cross-retaliation;
however, they raise serious questions about its supposed superiority over
other retaliatory measures.
II. CROSS-RETALIATION IN PRACTICE: IP HOSTAGES AND FINANCIAL
SETTLEMENTS
The competing purposes of WTO retaliation have informed the three
cases in which cross-retaliation has been sought—and approved—at the
WTO. Arbitrators have found convincing arguments based on the relative
sizes of the economies, bolstering arguments about the potential ill effects on
the complaining country from imposing restrictions on imports from the noncompliant country. Moreover, these potential imbalanced effects suggested
that other measures would not be effective in inducing compliance. However, like other retaliatory measures, cross-retaliation has proven less effective as a threat by small countries against larger countries. In one of the three
cases, EC–Bananas III, Ecuador entered into an agreement with the EU
whereby the EU eliminated its discriminatory quotas and pledged to reduce
discriminatory tariffs. The final tariff rates, however, will not be achieved
until a full twenty years after the challenge was brought in the WTO.153 Intellectual property rights were not suspended.
Two more recent cases have neither resulted in compliance, nor in suspension of intellectual property rights. In a challenge brought against the
United States by Antigua, the countries have reached a stalemate, under
which the United States has refused to bring its laws into compliance with
GATS and Antigua continues to threaten to suspend intellectual property
rights—but has not done so thus far. It may be that the threat of cross-retaliation is more effective only when credible. Thus, when Brazil threatened to
suspend pharmaceutical patents held by U.S. entities in the second case, the
threat did prompt action by the United States. Even so, this more credible
threat did not result in compliance. Instead, it precipitated a private, financial
153. See infra Part II.A.
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settlement. This Section describes the cases in which a WTO Arbitrator approved suspension of concessions under TRIPS. In none of these cases, however, have intellectual property rights been suspended. Thus, the emerging
picture of cross-retaliation is that it is not a good tool to induce compliance;
instead, it may spur negotiation of financial damages—but only for countries
that otherwise have leverage.
A. European Community–Bananas III
The first case in which cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement
was sought and approved resulted neither in full compliance nor in IP rights
suspension. As the name implies, EC–Bananas III,154 is one in a series of
cases. The banana disputes have been a decades-long battle over preferential
market access granted by European states to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (“ACP”) group of countries while restricting imports from banana-producing Latin American countries.155 In 1996, Ecuador, together with Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, challenged the EU’s
agreement, called the Common Market Organization for Bananas
(“CMOB”), as noncompliant with WTO agreements, including GATT and
GATS.156 In 1997, a dispute resolution panel found the EU in violation of
the WTO Agreement,157 a decision subsequently upheld by the Appellate
Body.158 When the EU failed to bring its import regime into compliance by
January 1999, Ecuador sought and received approval to impose retaliatory

154. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC–Bananas III].
155. Bananas I resulted in a panel opinion holding that various European regimes violated
GATT’s most favored nation requirement that “any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity”
granted to goods from one contracting parties be afforded to goods from all contracting parties.
GATT art. 1.1. Panel Report, European Economic Community – Member States’ Import Regimes
for Bananas, DS32/R, ¶ 364-72, 375 (June 3, 1993) (not adopted) [hereinafter EC–Bananas I]. Subsequently, the European Union countries entered into the “Common Market Organisation for Bananas,” harmonizing the (preferential) treatment of bananas from certain countries and territories.
Panel Report, European Economic Community – Import Regime for Bananas, ¶ 1 (Jan. 18, 1994),
34 I.L.M. 180, 181 (1995) (not adopted). This agreement was also found to violate GATT in Bananas II. Id. at ¶ 170. However, the GATT’s dispute settlement process required member consensus
in order to adopt a panel opinion, and thus Bananas II was blocked from adoption by the EU. Chi
Carmody, Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under GATT, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 615, 645 (1997).
156. The United States was not a producer of bananas, but challenged CMOB as noncompliant
with GATS.
157. Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU (adopted Sept. 25, 1997).
158. Appellate Body Report, EC–Bananas III, supra note 154.
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countermeasures on goods from the EU.159 Ecuador sought to suspend obligations and concessions it had made under the TRIPS Agreement in addition
to GATS and GATT 1994—up to an amount of $450 million.160
Ecuador’s request for authorization of cross-retaliation was based on its
argument that it was not practicable or effective for it to implement its entire
retaliation within the agreements that the EU had violated. The Arbitrator
found compelling Ecuador’s argument that because its imports from the EU
were often used as “inputs in the domestic manufacturing process,” imposing
retaliatory tariffs would harm Ecuador’s manufacturers—in addition to its
consumers—more than it would harm European exporters.161 The Arbitrator
also looked to the relative sizes of the markets, noting that “Ecuador, as a
small developing country, only accounts for a negligible proportion of the
[European Communities’] exports of these products” and, therefore, “the suspension of concessions by Ecuador vis-à-vis the European Communities is
unlikely to have any significant effect on demand for these [European Communities’] exports.”162 As a result, the arbitrators recommended and the
panel approved retaliation up to an amount of $201.6 million annually
through suspension of concessions under GATT 1994, GATS, and TRIPS.163
Ecuador proposed suspending the Ecuadorian intellectual property rights of
European entities in sound recordings, industrial designs, and geographical
indications.164
Despite authorization, Ecuador did not implement the proposed retaliatory measures. Instead, the countries ultimately reached a settlement, albeit
following further challenges. In April 2001, the EU and Ecuador agreed that
Ecuador would suspend sanctions if the EU transitioned, by 2006, to a tariffonly system instead of its previous combined tariff and quota system.165
However, after a few years, Ecuador found that the measures the EU took
were insufficient and, in 2008, the Appellate Body upheld a panel finding
that the EU’s treatment of bananas based on their source country continued
to violate GATT, once again requesting the EU to bring its provisions into

159. Arbitration Decision, EC–Bananas III, supra note 69, ¶¶ 171–77.
160. Id. ¶ 1.
161. Id. ¶¶ 89–96.
162. Id. ¶¶ 95–96.
163. Id. ¶¶ 170–73.
164. Id. ¶¶ 161–63.
165. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision, European Communities – Transitional
Regime For the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov. 21, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_ec_bananas_e.htm; Press Release, Lamy Hails Accord Ending Long Running Banana Dispute,
WTO
Doc.
PRESS/591
(Dec.
15,
2009),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr591_e.htm.
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compliance.166 In 2012, the EU and ten Latin American countries reached a
new settlement and signed an agreement containing reductions in tariffs over
time (and no quotas) for banana importation by the EU.167
This was the first time TRIPS suspension was threatened, and the moral
of its approval is not entirely clear. While the agreement ultimately achieved
compliance, it is likely that the EU’s desire to demonstrate a commitment to
its international legal commitments and pressure from the United States
played at least as large a role in its decision to comply as the threat of intellectual property rights suspension. Because the United States lined up with
the Latin American countries, any retaliatory countermeasures approved
were likely to present real threats, regardless of whether they were tariff- or
TRIPS-related. Perhaps the situation fit into the unavoidable breach category, as the EU was able to negotiate to maintain preferences, albeit for a
limited number of years. An assessment of the economic impact of the EU’s
measures, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. Nor does this case
offer a clear narrative about developing countries prevailing in the face of
resistance from developed countries. The countries given preferential treatment by the EU were in some cases least developed economies, and the EU’s
ultimate compliance with the settlement is still likely to harm banana producers in those countries. This may change commentator sympathies about the
distributional effects of the outcome, if not on the ultimate legal question of
what would constitute compliance. Nevertheless, the case forged a path—
one that seemed desirable to other developing countries, in addition to academics.
B. United States—Gambling
The DSB has authorized Antigua to suspend its obligations under
TRIPS to holders of intellectual property rights as a result of the United
States’ prohibition on online gambling. Online gambling is the second-largest employer in Antigua, after tourism.168 In 2003, the United States began
blocking online gambling sites hosted in Antigua, consistent with its federal
166. Ecuador requested consultations with EU under Article 21.5 of DSU; the Compliance
Panel concluded that the EU’s unilaterally reformed banana regime was inconsistent with its WTO
obligations under Articles I, II and XIII of GATT, a decision upheld by the WTO Appellate Body
in November 2008. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 478, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (adopted Nov. 26,
2008) (upholding panel’s finding of violations of Art. II and Art. XIII of GATT).
167. Historic Signing Ends 20 Years of EU-Latin American Banana Disputes, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/disp_08nov12_e.htm; EU
and Ten Latinamerican Countries End 20-Year ‘Banana Dispute’, MERCOPRESS (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/09/eu-and-ten-latinamerican-countries-end-20-year-banana-dispute.
168. Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, J. INT’L COM. & ECON.
1, 2 (2009).
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and state anti-racketeering laws prohibiting cross-border gaming services.169
Indeed, the United States issued an arrest warrant against Jay Cohen, founder
of World Sports Exchange, who owned an American gambling site in Antigua.170 Antigua challenged various provisions of U.S. law as inconsistent
with its obligations under GATS.171
Specifically, Antigua argued that the U.S. prohibitory measures were in
violation of “market access” rules provided under Article XVI:1 of GATS by
allowing domestic companies to offer online gambling services to U.S. citizens while prohibiting overseas Internet gambling services from Antigua.172
Antigua further contended that this resulted in a “total prohibition” of Antigua’s cross-border supply of services in the United States, a “limitation on
the number of service suppliers” and “limitation on the total number of service operations”173 in violation of Article XVI:2 of GATS.174 In addition,
Antigua argued that such restrictions constituted a “total prohibition” of the
betting services and hence, amounted to a “zero quota” limitation, which was
again prohibited by Article XVI:2 of GATS.175 Lastly, Antigua claimed that
the United States treated domestic and foreign service suppliers unequally,
amounting to a “national treatment” violation under Article XVI:1 of GATS,
which obligates every WTO member to treat the service suppliers of its own
country and those of other member countries equally.176 In response, the
United States argued that it had not made commitments with respect to gambling services, and that a lack of numerical format in its provisions meant it
was not a limitation on the number of service providers.177 Additionally, it
argued that its anti-racketeering laws fit the “public morals” exception provided for under Article XIV of GATS.178

169. In particular, Antigua challenged the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act as inconsistent with U.S. obligations under GATS. Panel Report, United States –
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 3.93, WTO Doc.
WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004).
170. Hartley Henderson, Antigua Offers a New Proposal to End Internet Gambling Dispute with
U.S., OFF-SHORE GAMING ASSOC. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.osga.com/online_gaming_articles.php?Antigua-offers-a-new-proposal-to-end-Internet-gambling-dispute-with-U.S.14330#.VYB5QflVikp (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
171. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, ¶ 3.28, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004).
172. Id. ¶¶ 3.124–25.
173. Id. ¶ 3.125.
174. Id.
175. Id. ¶ 3.134.
176. Id. ¶¶ 3.129, 3.150.
177. Id. ¶¶ 3.126–27.
178. Id. ¶¶ 3.278–79.

RajecFinalBookProof

2016]

11/3/2016 4:57 PM

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE

205

The WTO panel held that the federal laws prohibiting online gambling
services violated both the market access rules and the national treatment obligation provided under GATS.179 The public morals defense was rejected
on the ground that the United States failed to demonstrate a total ban on all
forms of internet gambling, such as those allowed under the Interstate Horse
Racing Act.180 The United States was unwilling to bring its laws in compliance with its commitments under GATS. Instead, the United States announced its intentions to modify its GATS schedule—a process unique to
that agreement—and exclude gambling services from its commitments.181
Following the panel decision, Antigua requested authorization to impose countermeasures under GATS and TRIPS in an amount of $3.4 billion.182 The arbitrators agreed that it was not “practicable or effective” for
Antigua to retaliate within the same sector as the original violation, as that
would require a suspension of entertainment services and result in harm to
Antiguan citizenry through higher prices for and potential deprivation of entertainment options.183 The great imbalance in trading positions of the two
countries was a key to their determination that cross-retaliation was appropriate—as with Ecuador, Antigua is a country with a relatively low trade volume, and the harm associated with retaliation would be much greater than the
harm to the United States of increased tariffs for a very small portion of its
exports. The arbitrators authorized Antigua to suspend the obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement at a level not exceeding $21 million annually.184
Antigua has periodically announced its intention to suspend U.S. copyrights in the music and film industries. In 2013, the country announced its
intention to operate a website that would sell works to its citizens, without
compensation to the American rights-holders185 and set up a committee to
oversee its plan.186 However, no such website has materialized. The reason
179. Id. ¶ 7.2(b).
180. Id. ¶ 6.600.
181. Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 1.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶ 4.52.
184. Id. ¶ 6.1; WTO Authorises Antigua to Move Forward on Retaliation in U.S. Gambling Dispute, BRIDGES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-authorises-antigua-to-move-forward-on-retaliation-in-us-gambling.
185. W. John Eagan, Antigua & Barbuda Planning to Launch Piracy Platform, MALLOY LAW
BLOG (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.malloylaw.com/blog/item/190-antigua-barbuda-planning-tolaunch-piracy-platform.
186. William New, Antigua Creating Platform to Monetise Suspended U.S. IP Rights from WTO
Case, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/10/24/antigua-creating-platform-to-monetise-suspended-us-ip-rights-from-trips-case/. The committee recommended
the establishment of a statutory body by the government of Antigua “to own, manage, and operate
the ultimate platform to be created for the monetisation or other exploitation of the suspension of
American intellectual property rights authorised . . . by the WTO.” Id.
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is unclear, though the Antiguan economy’s reliance on tourism from the
United States and its fear of political retaliation from the United States provides a potential explanation.187 The Antiguan example demonstrates that,
for countries that cannot credibly threaten to suspend intellectual property
rights, cross-retaliation alone will not place a weak WTO member in a better
position. This calls into question the notion that intellectual property rights
suspension will solve the problems of power imbalance that others have
pointed out in the WTO remedial scheme.
C. United States—Upland Cotton
Brazil and the United States are both major producers and exporters of
cotton, though their respective shares of the worldwide market have fluctuated over the years.188 Following consultations in 2002, Brazil requested the
establishment of a panel189 to adjudicate its claims that various U.S. government programs were inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture (“AA”), and Article XVI of GATT.190 The panel ruled that a number
of U.S. programs were inconsistent with the agreements.191 The Appellate
Body upheld nearly all of the panel findings in 2005, and made recommendations for the United States to bring its programs into compliance.192 The

187. See Henderson, supra note 170 (speculating that “the island continuously refused to use
that ruling fearing retaliation by the American government against the island in the area of tourism
bans, which would have completely devastated their economy”).
188. ERS Report CWS-11d-01, Brazil’s Cotton Industry Economic Reform and Development
(U.S.D.A. 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/111523/cws11d01_1_. In 1999, the country had
119 licensed operators employing around 3,000 people. Joseph M. Kelly, Clash in the Caribbean:
Antigua and U.S. Dispute Internet Gambling and GATS, 10 GAMING RES. & REV. J. 15, 15 (2005).
189. Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R
(adopted Sept. 8, 2004).
190. See id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1, 2.2. The report describes the challenged programs as follows:
[P]rohibited and actionable subsidies provided to United States producers, users and/or
exporters of upland cotton, as well as legislation, regulations and statutory instruments
and amendments thereto providing such subsidies (including export credit guarantees),
grants, and any other assistance to United States producers, users and exporters of upland
cotton. They include measures referred to as marketing loan programme payments (including marketing loan gains and loan deficiency payments (LDPs)), user marketing
(step 2) payments, production flexibility contract payments, market loss assistance payments, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, crop insurance payments, cottonseed
payments and export credit guarantee programmes . . . .
Id. ¶ 2.2 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. ¶ 2.1.
192. Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 5, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 3, 2005). The Panel recommended the withdrawal of prohibited
subsidies such as the export credit guarantees and step 2 payments and the removal of adverse effects or withdrawal of price-contingent subsidy measures. See id. ¶ 4.
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United States subsequently made some changes to its programs, spurring further challenges from Brazil and another panel report193 and Appellate Body
decision194 upholding many of the panel’s findings of continued violations.
In 2005, after the first Appellate Body ruling, Brazil sought to retaliate
against the United States for its continuing violations and arbitration was initiated.195 During the second set of proceedings, the arbitration was suspended but it resumed in 2008.196 Brazil sought permission to cross-retaliate
by suspending concessions under TRIPS and GATS to compensate for $3
billion worth of loss.197 Brazil based its request on the potential damage to
its own consumers that would result from imposing tariffs on ninety-five percent of the U.S. imports into Brazil, including many of its medical, educational, and food supplies.198 The arbitrators determined that Brazil could suspend obligations under TRIPS after the allowable countermeasures in tariffs
reached a certain threshold each year.199 Brazil subsequently announced its
intention to impose countermeasures up to $829 million on U.S. goods, including $268 million for cross-retaliation in pharmaceutical patents.200
The threat of suspension of the rights of U.S. patent holders on certain
pharmaceutical companies comes with real heft. Brazil is a major market for
pharmaceuticals, but it also has a strong domestic industry.201 The government has supported the domestic pharmaceutical industry through a variety
of investment policies, while also promoting policies that allow for greater
access to medicines for its population.202 As a result, the domestic industry
supplies a large portion of the domestic market, but the portion supplied by
foreign manufacturers—with patented drugs—is of significant importance to
U.S. drug makers.203
Despite the long and involved legal process, Brazil has not suspended
intellectual property rights. And the United States has not eliminated the

193. Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Brazil, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/RW (adopted Dec. 20, 2007).
194. Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/AB/RW (adopted June 2, 2008).
195. Arbitrator Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 5.102, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/ARB/2 (adopted Aug. 31, 2009).
196. Id. ¶ 1.22.
197. Id.
198. Id. ¶¶ 5.116–17.
199. Id. ¶ 6.3.
200. Ryan Conroy, Looking Back on the U.S.—Brazil Upland Cotton Dispute, POLITIK PRESS
(Feb. 17, 2014), at 14.
201. Protectionist Measurements Guard Domestic Pharmaceutical Industry Growth,
EMERGING MARKETS ONLINE, WLNR 25088643 (Oct. 7, 2013).
202. Id.
203. See id. (“[A]ccording to Brazil’s local media Valor Economico, by June 2013 half of the
Brazilian pharmaceutical sales were generated by domestic manufacturers.”).
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inconsistent measures. Instead, the countries have come to a private settlement. In 2010, the United States agreed to pay Brazilian cotton farmers
$147.3 million per year while the countries continued to negotiate.204 In October 2014, the countries finally settled the dispute entirely through a onetime payment, by the United States, of $300 million to the Brazil Cotton Institute.205 The Brazilian story does not show compliance, nor does it show a
temporary relaxation of intellectual property rights that may be used to provide access to medicines to those who need them. In contrast to the Antiguan
story, however, it does demonstrate the use of cross-retaliation to garner a
financial settlement, thereby serving a compensatory purpose.
III. EVALUATING CROSS-RETALIATION THREATS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
These case studies demonstrate that cross-retaliation is not operating to
achieve either the compliance or the compensatory purposes of WTO remedies, and that cross-retaliation is only moderately useful as a means of providing monetary compensation for breaches through settlement. Particularly,
cross-retaliation will not solve the difficulty of achieving relief for countries
that suffer a great power-differential against a noncompliant country and are
unable to mount a credible threat of intellectual property rights suspension.
In this way, the cases show that cross-retaliation may suffer from the same
problems as other means of enforcement. At the same time, cross-retaliation
through the TRIPS Agreement has costs to intellectual property rights that
have not been fully accounted for in prior discussions, which have primarily
focused on perceived benefits. Cross-retaliation operates in ways that are at
cross-purposes with international intellectual property goals and presents a
number of practical difficulties as well. As a result, the limited benefits associated with cross-retaliation must be weighed against these potential costs.
A. The Trade Perspective on Cross-Retaliation Through Intellectual
Property Rights Suspension
From a compliance theory viewpoint, cross-retaliation appears far less
appealing in practice than in theory. Of the three cases, EC–Bananas III is
the only case that arguably resulted in compliance, although it was actually a
settlement with negotiated acceptable tariff treatments in the future. It took
204. Editorial, U.S.–Brazil Cotton Deal Perpetuates an Unhealthy Status Quo of Subsidies,
WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-brazil-cotton-deal-perpetuates-an-unhealthy-status-quo-of-subsidies/2014/10/07/d8346bf4-4b2a-11e4-891d713f052086a0_story.html.
205. News Release, United States and Brazil Reach Agreement to End WTO Cotton Dispute,
USDA
(Oct.
1,
2014),
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2014/10/0219.xml.
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fifteen years to get that agreement, meaning that the potential for cross-retaliation did not appear to create a sense of urgency with regard to compliance.206 In addition, because other retaliatory measures were at stake from
the United States and from Ecuador besides retaliation under the TRIPS
agreement, it is not clear which of these threats resulted in the compliance—
if any. It is entirely possible that Europe’s eventual capitulation stemmed
from other considerations wholly unrelated to remedial threats, such as reputation and reciprocity.207
Similarly, the two more recent cases did not, by any measure, result in
compliance with WTO rules.208 In the United States-Gambling dispute, Antigua is still waiting for relief from its claim and continues to threaten suspension of United States copyrights. This threat, however, has not mobilized
lobbying forces in the United States sufficiently to result in compliance with
the WTO ruling or in a settlement approximating monetary damages. Antigua, moreover, is a developing country with an economy tens of thousands
of times smaller than the United States.209 This is one situation in which
cross-retaliation appears—at first blush—to be a desirable alternative to other
types of trade retaliation. Antigua’s relative weakness means that traditional
retaliatory measures are unlikely to be effective in forcing compliance. However, in this case, cross-retaliation did not change the story. This could be
for a few different reasons. For example, it could be that Antigua is unable to
withstand diplomatic pressure from the United States and would rather preserve a good relationship than implement this remedy.210 Or, perhaps Antigua does not have the technological capability to allow for a purely domestic
distribution of copyrighted goods. A system for distribution of copyrighted
work would certainly take some investment to implement. If the United
States were to change its laws or offer a desirable settlement, Antigua would
then have to discontinue its distribution. One likely explanation for Antigua’s delay in carrying through the threat, then, is that the country is anticipating such a settlement offer and would rather settle the matter without investing in carrying out its threat if possible. And why hasn’t the United States
complied? It may be that the views of the United States on online gambling
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. See supra Part II.A–B. The United States actually formally withdrew gambling from its
GATS commitments, which means that it is now compliant with its commitments. While GATS
allows for opt-outs, other agreements do not.
209. Based on data from the World Bank, showing that the Gross Domestic Product of Antigua
and Barbuda is $1.221 billion, compared to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product of $17.42 trillion.
Antigua and Barbuda Data, WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/antigua-and-barbuda
(last visited Jan. 22, 2016); United States Data, WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
210. See supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing Antigua’s fear of a tourism ban by the
United States).
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are so strong—whether by conviction or by lobby—that it is legislatively unable to change its law. This may be one of those cases where compliance is
simply not possible. Still, it is noteworthy that in addition to its refusal to
comply, the United States has also not come to a settlement agreement with
Antigua. Perhaps the United States realizes that Antigua’s threat is not viable. Whatever the reason for the stalemate, the threat of cross-retaliation
through suspension of intellectual property rights has not compelled the
United States to comply. Moreover, the possible explanations are generalizable to other small economies.
Similarly, the United States-Upland Cotton dispute did not result in
compliance by the United States. Brazil’s credible threat to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry resulted in pressure on the American government. However, the considerable lobbying power of the cotton industry that received the
illegal subsidy and the gridlock that has characterized the American Congress
together made compliance politically impossible in the United States. As a
result, the United States is now subsidizing both American and Brazilian cotton farmers—the former through the various challenged subsidy programs,
and the latter through a monetary payment to a fund intended for disbursement to Brazilian farmers. In contrast to Antigua, Brazil’s threat of crossretaliation spurred a financial settlement, but was not effective in spurring
compliance.
Noncompliance in the Gambling and Upland Cotton cases may be explained by any number of factors. One compelling explanation for both cases
comes from Rachel Brewster, who shows that the United States is most likely
to comply with WTO rulings when compliance may be achieved through executive action and least likely when compliance requires congressional action.211 Brewster’s work suggests that cross-retaliation—or any type of remedy—may be more or less effective at inducing compliance depending on the
institution in charge of noncompliant laws. This explanation also suggests
why it may be difficult to calibrate remedies to encourage only minimal
breach. Congressional inability or refusal to change laws in order to comply
with WTO rulings may merely reflect a collective action problem, where no
one lawmaker wants to be seen as an enemy to the industry benefiting from
noncompliance. At the same time, congressional inaction could just as well
be characterized as a reflection of domestic values that is not properly represented in the treaties negotiated by the executive branch. In other words,
Brewster’s insight into congressional inaction could support both a conclusion that Congress is unable to determine when it is expedient to breach—or
that failure to comply is a reflection of Congress identifying precisely the
situations when breach is expedient and unavoidable. But, even if these cases

211. See Brewster, supra note 16.
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show instances of Congress making rational determinations about the value
of breach, cross-retaliation does not greatly aid in making this determination.
Furthermore, from a compensatory damages viewpoint, cross-retaliation delivers less in practice than in theory. Cross-retaliation was potentially
attractive because it allowed for pricing compliance—or pricing breach—
when complaining countries were otherwise unable.212 In particular, for
countries that are unable to retaliate because the retaliation causes more damage to their industry than to the violator country’s industries, cross-retaliation
through intellectual property was seen as a way to impose the cost of breach
on the noncompliant country at little cost to—and with potential benefit for—
the complaining country. In addition, because countries could still negotiate,
cross-retaliation served as a potential stand-in for financial damages.213
Although United States-Uplands Cotton did result in monetary compensation, this was only when the complaining country posed a credible threat
to U.S. holders of intellectual property rights. Although a developing country, Brazil is a significant market for the United States. And while its decision
to suspend intellectual property rights may have galvanized the United States
to settle, Brazil was also authorized to suspend other trade concessions as
well. In this case, patent rights served as another lever for a country that
already had some weight in its negotiations with the United States. Of course,
the threat of suspending pharmaceutical patents was significant to an important U.S. industry, but Brazil was only able to exercise its influence on the
United States because of the size of its markets to begin with. So, while the
threat of intellectual property rights suspension may have helped Brazil to
obtain compensation for the trade distortion it suffered, this result cannot be
generalized to other developing markets searching for a means of collecting
compensation for another country’s breaches of WTO law.214 This means
that for least developed and developing countries, cross-retaliation may not
212. See id. at 261–63, 265.
213. See supra note 142.
214. This raises another potential problem with cross-retaliation from the efficient breach viewpoint: the size of the negotiated settlement is likely to mirror the value of the intellectual property
rights to the noncompliant country, not the size of the harm to the complaining country. Theoretically, these values should be the same, because the rights-suspension is keyed towards the value of
the initial violation. DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.4. However, this form of retaliation layers approximations upon approximations. Determination of the initial harm is not a precise science. See
Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 143–45 (discussing the methodology for calculating harm
done to Brazil by illegal subsidies). This approximation (that is part of all countermeasure proceedings at the WTO) must then be followed in cases of cross-retaliation by determining an equivalent
amount of harm through suspension of some number of patents for some amount of time. This
double approximation likely results in a less accurate calculation of what should be compensatory
damages than countermeasures that are imposed through tariff increases, and is problematic because
the theory of efficient breach relies upon setting the cost of breach correctly, thereby ensuring that
the set remedy neither over- nor under-encourages breach. Id. at 149–50. But see Abbott, supra
note 11, at 561–62 (suggesting that valuation of IP assets is not unusually difficult).
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be as useful of a tool as some have suggested because it is most useful for
those that provide a large market. There are other, practical reasons why
mounting a credible threat of cross-retaliation is likely limited to a relatively
small number of developing countries that are discussed in more detail below.215
The problem with cross-retaliation, then, from either point of view, is
that it is unlikely to give leverage to countries that otherwise have none. Unfortunately, this was one of the strongest arguments in favor of the use of
cross-retaliation. In the case of Brazil, retaliation was approved under the
GATT, GATS, and TRIPS agreements, so part of the problem that was solved
by cross-retaliation was that countermeasures under the violated agreements
(GATT and SCM) would not allow for enough retaliation.216 And for Brazil,
with its strong generic drug industry, the threat of suspending pharmaceutical
patents was a strong one. But least developed countries and those with weak
economies are unlikely to have strong generic drug industries. Instead, some
developing countries that have relatively strong economies are the most
likely to have strong generic drug industries. Cross-retaliation may have
some distributional benefits, then, but they are skewed towards those who are
relatively well off to start with. It is unlikely to bring great benefit to countries that cannot mount a credible threat due to the small size of their overall
markets or to their underdeveloped industry, both of which can undermine
the threat associated with cross-retaliation. In the case of Antigua, the reason
its threat is not credible may be that it simply relies on U.S. trade and good
relations too much for it to make sense to impose the sanction.217
In addition, for those suggesting that cross-retaliation would result in
suspension of IP rights and that this would be beneficial to developing and
least developed countries because of increased access to innovation,218 the
cases to date give little support to this viewpoint. In none of the three cases
where intellectual property rights suspension was authorized was the remedy
implemented, and access interests were not served by the threat of suspension. There are likely diplomatic and practical reasons for this. In terms of
diplomacy, intellectual property rights suspension is a strong threat, and it
may be that complaining countries have little interest in carrying through be-

215. See infra Section III.B.
216. Arbitration Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶¶ 6.1–6.5, WTO Doc.
8WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31 2009); Arbitration Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, ¶¶ 6.1–6.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31 2009).
217. For example, according to USAID, the United States gave $476,000 in aid to Antigua and
Barbuda in 2012, $711,000 in 2013, and $512,000 in 2014, much of which was security assistance
for the military and for narcotics enforcement. Foreign Aid Explorer, USAID, https://explorer.usaid.gov/country-detail.html#Antigua and Barbuda (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
218. See supra note 145.
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cause of the potential chill in diplomatic relations or the potential for decreased aid.219 In addition, it is easier to impose, increase, decrease, and lift
tariff-based retaliation than it is to impose intellectual property-based retaliatory measures, making intellectual property rights suspension less flexible
than tariff-based retaliation in diplomatic negotiations.
There are also practical complications that accompany suspension of intellectual property rights. For tariff-based retaliation, the government of a
complaining country implements the retaliation itself by collecting higher
tariffs. When suspending intellectual property rights, however, the complaining country needs to recruit actors to capitalize on the suspended intellectual
property rights, unless those with technological know-how and capacity already stand ready to do so.220 Either way, the actor must possess sufficient
technological prowess to capitalize on the scientific or artistic innovations
hitherto protected, whether that means developing generic versions of drugs
that were previously only manufactured by the patent holder or developing
an online platform to facilitate the distribution of previously-protected movies and music within the complaining country. And because countermeasures
of any sort may only be implemented until compliance is achieved, any investment necessary to exploit the intellectual property may be lost if and
when the dispute is resolved. The United States-Uplands Cotton dispute may
have been the rare case where non-governmental actors could capitalize on
the suspended intellectual property rights, due to Brazil’s strong generic
pharmaceutical industry and its record of public-private partnerships in the
drug industry.221 However, in United States-Gambling, Antigua was only
able to make vague threats about an internet platform that would allow for
sharing of copyrighted materials.222 It is unclear how much progress has been
made on this project, if any, or how private actors in Antigua are being induced to invest in such a project.
B. The Intellectual Property Perspective on Cross-Retaliation
The potential benefits of threatening to suspend intellectual property
rights—which I have argued are much smaller than imagined—come with
costs and serious practical difficulties specific to the nature of the rights at
issue. For example, patent rights are effective because they provide certainty
that investments in innovation will be protected for a discrete length of time,
but the potential for intellectual property rights suspension limits that certainty. As a result, in contrast to retaliation through raising tariffs, retaliation
219. See supra note 82.
220. See Abbott, supra note 11, at 585 (“Capital investment based upon a regime that is subject
to termination on short notice may not be advisable.”).
221. See supra Part II.C.
222. See supra Part II.B.
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through intellectual property rights suspension has the potential to impose
diffuse social welfare costs by decreasing incentives to innovate worldwide.223 Increasing globalization also makes it difficult to constrain the costs
of retaliation to companies “from” a single, offending country. Last, crossretaliation also raises several practical problems unique to the nature of intellectual property protection, such as the difficulty of valuation, the need for
significant private action to implement the suspension, and the pressure to
maintain a way to reverse the rights-suspension when the appropriate level
of retaliation is reached or the violator country amends its laws. These features mean that while cross-retaliation may be a useful option for some countries, it is not an effective option for least developed countries with relatively
small markets and relatively weak economies.
One cost of a cross-retaliation regime is that the uncertainty associated
with the potential suspension of intellectual property rights may result in
lower investment in innovation—a cost with global externalities. The utilitarian justification for intellectual property rights posits that the rights represent a balance between the public’s interest in access to innovation and the
need to encourage future innovation by granting inventors and creators the
right to exclude others from marketing goods that embody their creations.224
Under such a theory, weakening intellectual property rights (through shorter
terms, weaker remedies, or more exceptions, for example) will result in less
innovation, while strengthening intellectual property rights will result in
more innovation. The threat of cross-retaliation through suspension of intellectual property rights introduces uncertainty and is therefore a weakening of
these rights. A company cannot control this risk ex ante, because cross-retaliation is imposed as retaliation for violations under other agreements, by
other industries.225 As a result, if credible threats of cross-retaliation become
more common, we can expect lower investments in innovation. One wrinkle
to this cost is that it may be incurred even when intellectual property rights
suspension is merely threatened, but not actually imposed. This is because
the threat alone can cause uncertainty that will make investment in innovative
industries less attractive than investment elsewhere. By allowing threats to
intellectual property rights through cross-retaliation, uncertainty is reintroduced.
A counter to the innovation-cost argument is that the uncertainty associated with suspension of intellectual property rights is limited because of the

223. See supra note 139 (discussing the purpose of patent rights and its potential to increase
investment in innovation, providing a social good).
224. See supra note 140 (discussing the balance between access and innovation).
225. This is not unique to cross-retaliation, as discussed in Section II.B, because the industry
that suffers under retaliatory measures is generally not the industry that has benefitted from the
initial violations. See supra Section II.B.
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low likelihood that a threatening country will carry out its threat. In none of
the cases discussed here were intellectual property rights suspended and there
are reasons to think this trend may continue. Instead, countries that can
mount a credible threat will pressure noncompliant countries to settle.226
However, another way to envision the potential cost to innovation of intellectual property rights suspension is that innovative companies, faced with
the threat of cross-retaliation, will need to divert further resources from research and development to lobbying, either for the government to amend laws
in violation and bring them into compliance, or for financial settlements. In
this way, innovative industries are deputized by the WTO dispute resolution
system to enforce compliance, or at least minimize noncompliance with
WTO rules in unrelated industries. Whether directly or indirectly, cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights imposes some costs on innovative and creative industries, although the scope of those costs so far is likely
small. Nevertheless, these costs may reasonably be assumed to impact the
industries’ innovative and creative capacities.
The costs of cross-retaliation do not end there, because there may be a
ripple effect of costs to foreign investment and trade in industries that rely on
innovation. This is not a problem of how much is invested in innovative
activity, but of where the investments are made geographically. One common critique of the TRIPS Agreement at the time it was signed was that intellectual property is not a free trade issue.227 However, the justification for
including it in the WTO Agreement was that uncertainty and wide disparity
in intellectual property protection served as a barrier to trade.228 Specifically,
innovative companies would hesitate to invest in countries that would not
protect their intellectual property. In addition, there were prohibitively high
transaction costs associated with figuring out whether the intellectual property rights were sufficient in each of many jurisdictions.229 According to this
view, the TRIPS Agreement encourages companies to do business globally
by providing a baseline of protection in all member states, and reducing risk
and the transaction costs of doing business.

226. The length of the dispute resolution process leading to implementation of intellectual property rights suspension also is likely to reduce the perceived cost of such threats, so that one would
not expect to see either a drastic or an immediate drop in investment in innovative industries upon
the filing of a complaint at the WTO targeting the practices of an unrelated industry.
227. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 32 (2012)
(casting the TRIPS Agreement as an intellectual property “tax” developing countries accepted in
order to access other markets for trade).
228. Brewster, supra note 11, at 51 (suggesting that developed countries set the stage for crossretaliation by linking intellectual property rights to market access issues in trade agreements during
the WTO negotiations).
229. Rajec, supra note 33, at 164.
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Decreased investment in innovation, to the extent cross-retaliation is
likely to drive such a decrease, is not necessarily a bad thing when it comes
in the service of greater access. The ideal level of innovative activity is a
much-debated question, as is the appropriate balance between access interests
and intellectual property rights protection.230 Thus, there may be circumstances in which decreased innovation is deemed worthwhile.231 Nonetheless, cross-retaliation is a very blunt tool for weakening intellectual property
rights—if that is in fact what we want—particularly if the threats are never
realized. From an intellectual property law perspective, it would be unfortunate to weaken incentives to invest in intellectual property without achieving
greater access to innovative goods. However, that is what happens if intellectual property-reliant industries bear the costs of lobbying their governments to comply with trade commitments while countries that are harmed
threaten, but do not suspend, intellectual property rights.232 Cross-retaliation
represents a privileging of trade dispute resolution over intellectual property
commitments, and the early results suggest that the returns—even in terms
of trade dispute resolution—are not particularly promising.
C. Why Cross-Retaliation Threats in Intellectual Property Don’t Work
(Well)
It may seem surprising that cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension is not as successful in practice as it is in theory. However, suspending intellectual property rights is different from imposing countermeasures in a number of practical ways that do much to explain why this
remedy falls short. There are practical complications associated with suspending intellectual property rights that make the remedy costly and difficult
for many countries to implement—or even to credibly threaten implementing. These complications include the complexity of valuing intellectual property rights, identifying which rights-holders to target, and inducing private
actors to capitalize on the newly available market, even while recognizing
that their authorization may be short-lived.
The value of retaliatory intellectual property rights suspension—like
any retaliatory measure—is limited by the requirement that retaliation be valued at an amount equivalent to the impact of the protested measures.233 This

230. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1067–69 (2005) (detailing the debate); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA.
L. REV. 65, 128 (2015) (detailing without taking a position on the appropriate level of incentives
and suggesting potential methods of gathering relevant data to address the question).
231. For instance, compulsory licensing.
232. For a discussion of the difficulty of setting efficient levels of intellectual property protection that also account for trade concessions, see Rajec, supra note 33, 168.
233. DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.4.
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creates difficulties in intellectual property rights suspension that do not arise
in tariff rate changes. For example, Brazil received approval to suspend intellectual property rights equivalent to a value of up to $268 million a year.
But determining how greatly a company values protection of its pharmaceutical products is more complicated than imposing tariffs under traditional
countermeasures. The value associated with suspending patent rights is complicated to determine because it depends on the market demand for the products absent protection and the price of generic substitutes, which will reflect
the cost of development and production to generic drug companies.234 Additionally, actions for retaliation under the WTO already require a showing of
injury. In other words, first the DSB must determine the harm imposed by
U.S. cotton subsidies and then must determine the appropriate level of intellectual property rights suspension that equals that level of harm. In addition
to doubling the complexity of damages calculations, cross-retaliation requires a determination of which rights-holders to affect. This raises several
questions. For example, if a copyrighted work of music is a collaboration
between people in different countries, one of whom is from the United States,
does cross-retaliation apply to the work? Similarly, if a U.S. pharmaceutical
company files foreign patents in the name of foreign subsidiaries, will it matter that the invention originated in the United States by a U.S. inventor? What
if the invention originated in a foreign laboratory, invented by an employee
of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company? The WTO has increased global
trade and global manufacturing, and with that the world has seen a proliferation of multi-national corporations. At this point, it is unclear how a country
with authority to suspend U.S. intellectual property rights can limit harms
associated with suspension of those rights exclusively to U.S. industries. If
there is a way, however, it seems clear that a sophisticated country will find
it worthwhile to circumvent those limits through strategic offloading of patents and other methods of corporate structuring.
One other clear difference between retaliation through increased tariffs
and intellectual property rights suspension is that the first involves government action that is relatively easily started and stopped by Customs, while
the second requires private actors who are equipped to exploit newly-unprotected intellectual property rights. Those private actors must also be willing
to support any startup costs required to exploit those rights, and maintain this
willingness even though the suspension of rights is capped at a certain level
and may be cancelled upon the violating country’s decision to bring its laws
into compliance.235 This difference between retaliation through tariffs and
retaliation through intellectual property rights-suspension is one explanation
234. Anyone who considers such calculations relatively simple ought to sit through damages
arguments in patent infringement trials.
235. See supra note 220.
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for why Brazil’s threats are more credible than Antigua’s. Brazil has a thriving pharmaceutical industry, including a robust generic drug manufacturing
industry that makes it uniquely suited to exploit suspending U.S. pharmaceutical patents. In fact, it is likely that beyond Brazil and India, there are few
countries able to mount a credible threat in this particular area of innovation.
But whatever the field, there are costs associated with bringing products to
market beyond intellectual property rights-related costs. These costs, such
as product development, manufacturing, and marketing, are borne by private
actors and not the government that has asked to implement them. Thus, in
order to effectively retaliate, Antigua would need to encourage or coordinate
a platform for the distribution of U.S. copyrighted works. And beyond the
costs associated with making goods that embody the suspension of intellectual property rights available, any private actor stepping into this role is subject to limits on their profits. Similarly, there is a risk that the violating country will bring its laws back into compliance, thereby requiring the harmed
country to reverse itself and begin protecting the rights again. These risks
likely make it difficult to find private actors willing to exploit the intellectual
property rights at all, even when there are actors well-positioned to do so.
This intellectual property perspective shows both that there are costs to
intellectual property when cross-retaliation is approved and that there are
costs associated with implementation of cross-retaliation, specific to the use
of intellectual property, that make it less appealing than it originally appears.
The practical costs may explain in part why threats to intellectual property
have not resulted in a satisfactory result for Antigua and Barbuda.
IV. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property rights suspension has been hailed as a desirable retaliatory measure for small and developing countries facing violations by
more powerful countries. However, authorization for cross-retaliation
through TRIPS has rarely been requested and authorized, and it has never
been implemented. The cases in which cross-retaliation under TRIPS has
been approved serve to highlight its deficiencies. An analysis of the three
cases in which cross-retaliation was authorized demonstrates that it will not
result in greater compliance, it is unlikely to solve the power imbalance problem in WTO remedies, and it is not a useful tool for solving problems such
as lack of access to innovation. This is not to suggest it can play no role.
Cross-retaliation may work for some well-positioned developing countries.
In such cases, cross-retaliation may serve as a blunt tool to gain monetary
compensation otherwise not provided for in the WTO. However, because it
is subject to the same problems of power imbalance between countries as all
WTO disputes, cross-retaliation does not fully satisfy either of the dual and
dueling goals of compliance and compensation that scholars have identified
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and promoted. In addition, cross-retaliation through intellectual property
rights suspension, if widely adopted as a strategy, may weaken intellectual
property rights without providing greater access to innovation. It is time to
reexamine this practice that has been wrongly hailed as a solution to the remedial problems at the WTO. It appears that this reexamination will favor a
decreased—or at least not expanded—role for the remedy.

